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ABSTRACT
Predicting Airline Corporate Bankruptcies 
Using a Modified Altman 
Z-Seore Model
by
Carla Kroeze
Dr. Karl Mayer, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Since 1979, 150 airlines have filed for bankruptcy. The airline industry was officially 
deregulated in October 1978, which brought about many changes including the 
strengthening of hub and spoke operations, fare-cutting, and the entry of new competitors 
into the industry. However, following deregulation, the airline industry has suffered 
financially from various problems: the economic recession of the early 1980s; rising jet 
fuel costs; rising labor costs; maintenance and interest costs; rising insurance costs; and 
intensified competition. The transition, from a regulated to a deregulated environment, 
increased the instability of the carriers’ operating profits. In 1998, airlines earned record 
profits, but by 2002, only two of the major carriers turned a profit. Since 1998, six major 
or national North American airlines filed for bankruptcy.
Ill
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The objective o f this study was to analyze bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines using a 
traditional bankruptcy prediction model, the Altman Z-score model, in order to evaluate 
its ability to predict financial distress in the airline industry. The four financial ratios 
used in the model represented liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity, and 
solvency. A second objective of this study was to develop and test a new statistical 
model that would better differentiate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines.
The new model used only three variables, predicted membership to only one of two 
groups, and used a simple zero as a cut-off to distinguish whether a firm belonged to the 
bankrupt group or the non-bankrupt group. Furthermore, the new model’s predictions 
were accurate up to four years in advance of a bankruptcy filing. The Z ” model, on the 
other hand, used four variables, did not always give a classification to one of two groups, 
and used two cut-offs. Furthermore, it performed no better than a naïve prediction in 
determining whether an airline firm should be classified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt.
IV
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, airlines earned record profits, but by 2002, only two of tbe major carriers 
turned a profit. What happened? Over capacity, higher fuel prices, recession, terrorism, 
war, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), high competition, declining traffic, 
and bad management have contributed to a six-year financial roller-coaster ride for the 
airline industry (Airline Industry Survey, 2003).
Since 1979, 150 airlines have filed for bankruptcy (United Airlines Annual Report, 
2003). The airline industry was officially deregulated in October 1978, which brought 
about many changes including the strengthening of hub and spoke operations, fare- 
cutting, and the entry o f new competitors into the industry. However, following 
deregulation, the airline industry has suffered financially from various problems: the 
economic recession o f the early 1980s; rising jet fuel costs; rising labor costs; 
maintenance and interest costs; foreign exchange risk; rising insurance costs; and, 
intensified competition. The transition, from a regulated to a deregulated environment, 
increased the instability o f the carriers’ operating profits. Total risk (i.e., the volatility of 
net profits over time) increased dramatically in the airline industry.
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There have been a number studies using the Altman Z-Score Model to predict airline 
bankruptcy and financial distress; such studies were completed in 1974, 1982, 1986, 
1992, 1996, and 2000. In 1986, Altman’s Z-Score model was tested to see if it could 
accurately predict airline bankruptcy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 2003, a 
doctoral dissertation was completed using the 1993 revised Altman Z”-Score model to 
determine the level of predictive accuracy between bankrupt and non-bankrupt publicly 
traded firms in the service industry (Hanson, 2003). Altman’s 1993 model correctly 
classified bankrupt service companies 92 percent, 69 percent, and 54 percent for years 
one, two, and three respectively. Thus, it is reasonable to continue to use this model for 
the current analysis of airlines, with the addition of several cash flow variables.
However, given the severe industry conditions and unpredictable events of the last six 
years, it is uncertain whether the Altman Model is still valid in assessing airline financial 
fitness. Furthermore, the Altman Z-Score model was revised in 1993 to a 4-variable 
model for nonmanufacturing firms, and this 4-variable model has not been tested on the 
airline industry. It may be the case that this 1993 model provides a better prediction than 
the 1968 model for predicting airline bankruptcies.
In late 2001, The United States (US) Congress formed the Air Transport Stabilization 
Board (ATSB), whose job was to dole out as much as $10 billion in loan guarantees to 
airlines unable to borrow in traditional credit markets after the September 11 terrorist 
hijackings (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). America West Airlines was the first to 
apply for and receive the guarantees. US Airways Chief Executive David N. Siegel said 
in his letter to employees, “we will file an application with the ATSB for a loan guarantee 
since we have no other access to additional funding while we restructure the airline.”
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The ATSB approved $900 million in backing for $1 billion in private loans to US 
Airways, provided that the airline obtain significant cuts. US Airways later filed for 
bankruptcy. United Airlines, the nation’s second-largest carrier, applied for $1.8 billion 
in ATSB loan guarantees, but had already racked up $678 million in losses before the 
terrorist attacks. United’s application was not approved. It later filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection (Maynard, 2004).
Other major or national airlines that have either received the federal loan bailout, filed 
for bankruptcy, or both, include AT A, Frontier, TWA, Hawaiian Air, and Air Canada. 
TWA is no longer operating; it flew its last official flight on December 1, 2001.
The airline industry is a cyclical industry. It is very vulnerable to economic 
downturns. The airline industry is characterized by both high capital costs and high labor 
costs. Labor costs account for about 36 percent to 40 percent o f total operating expenses 
(Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). Airlines are also energy-intensive operations. Fuel 
expenses are apt to remain near historical highs for the foreseeable future. Airline 
companies typically carry a significant amount of debt, contributing to their high fixed 
cost capital structures. When business drops off and costs are not covered, the result can 
be reorganization in bankruptcy, liquidation, or in recent cases of airline financial 
distress, the use o f government loan bail-outs. The big airlines have been reeling since 
2001, together posting more than $24 billion of dollars of losses due in part to constricted 
demand and higb costs (Maynard, 2004).
The industry is highly volatile and is known for its propensity for financial distress. 
Stockholders, bondholders, other creditors, financial analysts, government regulatory 
bodies, and the traveling public need the ability to asses the level o f financial distress that
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prevails in the industry (Davalos, Gritta, and Chow, 1999). For this reason, models that 
can forecast financial distress are useful. Financial distress can be predicted one, two, 
and sometimes three years ahead of its occurrence using traditional financial ratios with 
statistical analysis (Altman, 1993).
If there were a means of predicting the combinations of characteristics that are likely 
to fail, corrective measures could be taken to alter their underlying problems, redefine 
strategies and procedures, or in some instances, avoid or reduce investments in 
questionable firms that cannot be salvaged (Patterson, 2001). One method of predicting 
financial distress that has been widely used for over 35 years is the statistical bankruptcy 
prediction model, first presented by Altman (1968). Altman’s model (Altman Z-Score 
Model) is a popular approach for not only forecasting bankruptcy in advance of the event, 
but also for gauging the overall financial condition of a firm.
The Altman Z-Score Model uses five financial ratios to represent the elements of 
failure prediction. These elements are liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity, 
solvency, and activity. Multiple discriminant analysis, a statistical technique, is applied 
to the financial ratios. The primary objectives of multiple discriminate analyses are to 
understand group differences and to predict the likelihood than an entity (individual or 
object) will belong to a particular class or group based on several metric variables (Hair, 
Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998). In this case, the two groups are financially 
distressed and non-financially distressed airlines, and the metric variables are the airlines’ 
financial ratios. Altman (1993) revised the model to a four-variable multiple discriminate 
model for nonmanufacturing firms, which is called the Z”-Score Model. The four
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financial ratios used in the model represent liquidity, cumulative profitability, 
productivity, and solvency.
This dissertation tests the Altman Z”-Score Model to see if it could have accurately 
predicted airline bankruptcy/financial distress over a recent six-year period. 
Additionally, this dissertation seeks to revise the Altman Z”-Score Model so that it may 
be successfully applied to the evolving landscape of the airline industry.
Statement of Objectives 
The objective of this study to analyze bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines using a 
traditional bankruptcy prediction model in order to evaluate its ability to predict 
bankruptcy in the airline industry. The second objective was to develop and test a revised 
bankruptcy prediction model that would better differentiate between airlines that are 
likely to fail and those that are not likely to fail, by comparing the new model’s 
classification rate with the rate from the existing Z”-score model.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation are as follows:
H Iq: There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
HI a: There is a relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2q: a  revised bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”- 
score model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
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H2a: a  revised bankruptcy prediction model is better than the Altman Z”-Score 
model in predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
Justifications of the Study
Several different statistical techniques have been used in the past to assess airline 
financial performance: multiple discriminant analysis (Gritta, 1974 and 1982; Scaggs, 
1986 Golaszewski, 1992; Chung and Szenberg, 1996); logistic regression (Gudmundsson, 
1999; Gudmundsson, 2002); and, a neural network approach (Davalos, Gritta, and Chow, 
1999; Gritta, Wang, Davalos, and Chow, 2000). Although the neural network approach 
predicted bankruptcy risk well, it is unlikely that individual investors, passengers, airport 
authorities, or airline management will be using artificial intelligence in the near future 
for this purpose.
Therefore, it was suggested that a revised model be developed and tested on existing 
airline businesses. A revised model can include one or more ratios that were not included 
in the earlier models, especially cash flow related ratios. From a practical standpoint, it 
makes good sense to include information about cash flows and fofal debf in a bankrupfcy 
predicfion. When a company lacks sufficient cash flow fo make ifs debf paymenfs, if is in 
defaulf and must either reorganize or liquidate.
All public corporations are required to submit a Statement o f Cash Flow (SCF) in 
their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. The SCF can yield some very 
valuable information, and it is possible that some of that information could be used to 
improve the results of the Altman Z”-Score Model. In fact, one bankruptcy prediction 
model developed by Beaver (1966) states that the cash flow fo debf ratio was the best
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single ratio predictor. Altman did not include this ratio because of the lack of consistent 
and precise depreciation data available from public firms. Among companies in the same 
industry, however, it may be possible to obtain sufficient information that will allow a 
revised Altman model to also include cash flow ratios. Thus, an up-to-date analysis of 
airlines can help to predict the next major or national airline failure.
There has not been a study applying the 1993 Altman Z”-Score model to the airline 
industry. Additionally, there has not been a prediction model for airlines that included 
cash flow variables, which are relevant factors in bankruptcy/financial distress. The goal 
of this dissertation was to develop a model that identifies the key elements of airline 
bankruptcy/financial distress. Such a model should be valuable to industry practitioners 
and academics alike. Thus, this research will add useful knowledge to both the 
transportation and financial literature.
Limitations o f the Study 
There are a number of limitations involved in this study. First, this analysis was 
limited by the availability of financial data on airlines. Only publicly traded corporations 
are required to make their financial statements available to everyone. Therefore, only 
publicly traded airlines were part of this study. The data used in this study was limited to 
that which is available in filings with the SEC.
A second limitation is the consistency of the data that is available. For example, some 
of the airlines rely on leasing arrangements to obtain jets, which are the most important 
assets for an airline. Other airlines have purchased their jets, using long-term debt
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financing. This leasing versus ownership difference may have an impact on the 
presentation of an airline’s balance sheet accounts.
A third limitation was the use of ratio analysis. Ratios are extremely useful to 
owners, creditors, and management in evaluating the financial condition of airlines. 
Ratios, however, are only indicators. Ratios do not reveal exactly what the problem is. 
Ratios only indicate that there may be a problem; in this case, much more investigation 
and analysis are required.
Delimitations of the Study
There were also several delimitations involved in this dissertation. First, the sample 
used in this study consisted of the Department of Transportation (DOT) classification 
known as major and national air carriers in North America. DOT defines major carriers 
as those airline firms that earn revenues of more than $1 billion per year, whereas 
national carriers include airline firms that earn revenues o f $100 million to $1 billion per 
year. Second was the use of traditional financial ratios to analyze the airline firms’ 
financial performance. This study does not use load factors, or other airline industry 
specific ratios, as used by Chow, Gritta, and Leung (1991). Third, there were 
delimitations associated with the choice of multiple discriminant analysis, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Several kinds of statistical analysis have been 
used in bankruptcy prediction models, including univariate analysis (Beaver, 1967), 
multiple discriminate analysis (Altman, 1968; Deakin, 1972; Edmister, 1972), logit 
analysis (Ohlson, 1980; Zavgren, 1985; Gentry, Newbold and Whitford, 1985; 
Gudmundsson, 2002), probit analysis (Grablowsky and Talley, 1981), and neural network
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analysis (Tam, 1991; Tam and Kiang, 1992; Gritta, Wang, Davalos, and Chow, 2000). 
Only multiple discriminant analysis was used in this study, in spite of its limitations as a 
statistical technique, including sensitivity to outliers, linearity, normality, and 
homogeneity of variances. This method has been used in more studies tban any other 
method and has consistently produced the most accurate prediction/classification 
accuracy.
Definitions
A priori probabilities — Probabilities tbat are based on prior knowledge about the sample. 
In an analysis where there are two equal-sized groups o f cases, the a priori 
probability of a case, chosen at random, being classified into the correct group, is 
50 percent.
Bankrupt — A debtor that, upon voluntary petition or one invoked by the debtor’s 
creditors, is judged legally insolvent.
Classification Accuracy — The percentage of cases that are classified into the correct 
group using a prediction model.
Collinearity — Expression o f the relationship between two (collinearity) or more
independent variables (multicollinearity). Collinearity exists when there is a 
statistical relationship between two independent variables.
Default — Failure to make required debt payments on a timely basis or to comply with 
other conditions o f an obligation or agreement.
Failure — A firm that has been a subject of bankruptcy proceedings, either voluntary or 
involuntary.
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Liquidation -  The sale of a firm’s assets, payment of outstanding debts, distribution of 
the remainder to shareholders, and going out of business; Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis — A statistical analysis technique for distinguishing 
among defined groups by developing a linear combination of discriminating 
independent variables. The goal of multiple discriminant analysis is to predict 
group membership from a set of predictors.
Non-bankrupt — A debtor that has not been the subject o f bankruptcy proceedings. 
Reorganization — The action that may allow a company to emerge from Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Reorganization may consist o f a series of agreements between the 
firm, its creditors, and the court which allow for the company to repay its debts 
and alter its structure to prevent the same event from arising again.
Revenue Passenger Miles — A measure o f an airline’s traffic. It refers to how many of an 
airline’s available seats were actually sold.
Univariate Analysis — A statistical technique to determine, on the basis of one dependent 
measure, whether samples are from populations with equal means.
Organization of the Dissertation 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes background for the 
problem statement, the problem statement, hypotheses to be tested, delimitations of the 
study, and definitions o f certain terms. Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is relevant to 
the study. Chapter 3 describes the data collected for use in the analysis and the methods 
that were used to construct the predictive model. Chapter 4 presents the model that was 
developed to predict failure or non-failure, the results of the prediction, and the tests of 
the research hypotheses. Tests of airlines that are not included in the development of the
10
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model are used to validate the model. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the test and 
offers conclusions, implications, and recommendations for further research.
1 1
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction
The literature review contained in this Chapter will provide a brief history and 
background of the airline industry, information on airline industry economics, 
background on the Altman Z-score bankruptcy prediction model, the Z-score model, a 
review o f studies on airline bankruptcy prediction which used the Z-Score model, and 
other bankruptcy prediction models.
The U.S. Airline Industry—A Historical Perspective
In 1903, the Wright brothers’ first successful flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina 
marked the beginning of the aviation industry. The industry became more developed 
with the United States’ participation in World War I. In 1927, Charles Lindberg’s solo 
flight across that Atlantic Ocean created massive public interest in flying (Boyd, 1999).
After this, air transport companies were started, including American Airways, which 
later became American Airlines, as well as Boeing, and United Aircraft and 
Transportation Corporation, which later became United Airlines.
The US Postal Service provided the opportunity for private aircraft to function as 
mail carriers. This proved to be one of the biggest factors in the growth of the air 
transportation industry. Passenger service was also initiated as a way to augment the
12
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incomes of the firms providing airmail services. Passenger volume grew, and the number 
of start-up airlines multiplied (Boyd, 1999).
During these early years of the aviation industry, as air traffic became more and 
more disorganized, it became apparent that air traffic rules were needed. In 1938, the 
Civil Aeronautics Authority, an independent regulatory bureau, was developed. By that 
date, many air transport companies were flying the new DC-3s, which were created to 
carry both mail and passengers. They could seat 21 passengers (Boyd, 1999).
In World War II, the U.S. sent commercial planes and pilots to Europe to participate 
in the war. The war generated support for development o f new aircraft, which would also 
benefit post-war commercial aviation. By the 1950s, there were dramatic improvements 
in capacity and comfort on commercial planes. Jet service was introduced in 1959, which 
made for the fastest cross-country service available. Following some serious mid-air 
collisions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was created to develop an air 
traffic control system.
During the 1970s, fuel prices escalated. This was the time o f the worldwide oil 
embargo. By then, Boeing had developed the first widebodied jet, the 747 jumbo, which 
had 385 seats compared with only 119 for the Boeing 707s that they replaced (Banks, 
1982). However, the most dramatic event to change the industry, up to that point, 
occurred in 1978: deregulation.
The Airline Deregulation Act eased the entry of new airline companies into the 
business and gave them the freedom to set their own fares and fly the routes they chose. 
Deregulation resulted in the growth of smaller, low-cost carriers and the mergers of larger 
carriers. Costs were reduced by using nonunion labor, smaller used planes, and shorter
13
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routes (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986). Air fares plummeted, and new routes opened. More 
cities than ever were serviced. Increased competition, lower fares, and expanded routes 
led to an increased demand for airline travel. In the mid-1970s, the major North 
American carriers flew 130 billion revenue passenger miles. By 1988, after a decade of 
deregulation, the number of revenue passenger miles had reached 330 billion (“The 
Airline Industry,” 2000).
The airline industry was also affected by rising jet fuel costs, labor costs, and 
maintenance and interest costs associated with maintaining and/or replacing an aging 
fleet (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986). The airline industry experienced its first drop in 
passenger numbers in a decade in 1989. Between 1989 and 1992, the industry lost about 
$10 billion. The Gulf War of 1991 and an economic recession had a devastating impact 
on the number of passengers flying and on airline revenues. High debt levels plagued the 
industry (Chow, Gritta, & Hockstein, 1988). Pan American and Eastern went bankrupt 
and were liquidated. Trans World Airlines (TWA) and Continental filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 and reorganized.
After the economic recession of the early 1990s, new firms continued to enter the 
market. Most of these airlines competed with limited route structures and lower fares 
than the major carriers. Expansion and health returned to the industry by 1995. In 1997 
and 1998, virtually all U.S. and Canadian carriers bit record profit levels.
By the beginning of 2001, the eight major U.S. airlines were feeling the effects of 
another economic recession. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World 
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC had a terrible 
impact on the U.S. domestic and global airline industries. U.S. Airlines were grounded
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for several days and many people cancelled their travel plans. Many airlines went 
bankrupt; others were forced to seek government-backed loans through the Federal 
Stabilization Act (Maynard & Atlas, 2002).
In late 2001, the U.S. Congress formed the Air Transport Stabilization Board 
(ATSB), whose job was to dole out as much as $10 hillion in loan guarantees to airlines 
unable to borrow in traditional eredit markets after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
hijackings. America West Airlines was the first to apply for and receive the guarantees. 
US Airways Chief Executive David N. Siegel said in his letter to employees, “We will 
file an application with the A.T.S.B. for a loan guarantee since we have no other access to 
additional funding while we restructure the airline.” The ATSB approved $900 million in 
backing for $1 billion in private loans to US Airways, provided that they obtain 
significant cost cuts. However, US Airways later filed for bankruptcy. United Airlines, 
the nation’s second-largest carrier, applied for $1.8 billion in A.T.S.B. loan guarantees, 
but had already racked up $678 million in losses before the terrorist attacks. United’s 
application was not approved, and it later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
(Maynard, 2004). Other major or national airlines that have filed for bankruptcy include: 
TWA, Hawaiian Air, and Air Canada. TWA is no longer operating; it flew its last 
official flight on December 1, 2001.
The larger, high-cost airlines were faced with increasing competition from domestic 
low-cost airlines. The domestic low-cost airlines, together with consumer expectations 
for lower fares, drove down revenues. In addition, the bursting of the technology 
industry bubble in 2000 caused a substantial decline in premium business travel.
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Conditions at Air Canada typified the struggles in the industry, post-September 11, 
2001. Their revenues were decreasing, but they were prevented from significantly 
reducing labor costs. According to Air Canada management, the declining economy, the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the war in Iraq, and the 2003 SARS outbreak all 
combined to cause a significant reduction in consumer demand and in passenger 
revenues. Management stated that most airlines have limited ability to reduce labor costs 
and have relatively fixed aircraft fleet costs (“Air Canada,” 2004). This means that the 
high-cost carriers were unable to bring down their costs structures to a level necessary to 
respond to the decline in traffic, or to the evolving landscape o f the airline industry.
Air Canada suffered a net loss o f (in Canadian dollars) $1.3 billion in 2001, a net loss 
of $828 million in 2002, and a net loss of $1.9 billion in 2003. Restated in U.S. dollars, 
these losses were approximately $950 million in 2001, $604 million in 2002, and $1.4 
billion in 2003. In the first quarter of 2003, alternative sources o f funding were not 
available. Air Canada elected to restructure its operations, debt, and capitalization under 
creditor protection. It also made a concurrent petition under the U.S. bankruptcy code.
In the years 1998-2004, several major and national carriers did not file for 
bankruptcy. These included AirTran (formerly Valu Jet, which was in bankruptcy after a 
crash in 1996 killed 110 passengers), America West, Continental (which had filed for 
bankruptcy in 1993), newcomer JetBlue, Alaska, American, Delta, Northwest, Frontier, 
and industry star performer Southwest. However, not all of these airlines are operating at 
a profit today. Most recently, AT A filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 
October 26, 2004.
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The smaller, discount operators in this group, Southwest and JetBlue, spend six cents 
or less to fly a seat a mile, excluding fuel costs. The bigger airlines, however, have 
higher costs of operations. US Airways says it costs ten cents to fly a seat a mile, 
excluding fuel, and American and United spend more than 8 cents per mile. That gap is 
killing the bigger carriers (McCartney, 2004).
Having reviewed a historical perspective of the airline industry, the next section of 
the chapter discusses the current economics of the airline industry.
Industry Economics
Most analysts consider the airline industry to have a very high business risk (Gritta, 
Freed, & Chow, 1998). Fixed costs are relatively high, and comprise about 25 to 30 
percent of operating revenues (Gritta, Chow, & Freed, 2003). Operating costs of a flight 
depend mostly on the distance traveled, and not on the number of passengers on board the 
flight itself. Fuel expenses, a highly volatile cost factor, account for about 30 percent of 
airline total costs. Labor costs also make up a significant portion of operating costs, 
absorbing about 40 percent o f operating revenues (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). 
Labor costs for both the crew and ground staff are determined largely by the type of 
aircraft, not by the number of passengers. The only true variable costs in the industry are 
travel agency commissions, food costs, and ticketing fees. Finally, the demand for air 
travel is very cyclical, and is also subject to seasonal fluctuations. Winter weather can 
reduce demand. The events of September 11, 2001, the recession in the U.S. economy, 
and the U.S. war with Iraq in 2003 have all disrupted the typical seasonality. For all 
these reasons, the airline industry is considered to have high business risk.
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Airlines also have high levels of financial risk. Financial risk is defined as the added 
variability in earnings to stockholders that results from using long-term debt to finance 
the firm’s capital assets (Gritta, Freed, & Chow, 1998). It is caused by interest and 
principal payments on debt service. This risk is the result of managerial decisions, rather 
than the business environment. Interest represents a fixed charge and thereby reduces 
reported profit. Also, the likelihood of financial distress increases as a firm uses more 
debt in its capital structure. The airline business is very capital intensive. It requires 
significant amounts of capital to fund the acquisition of assets, especially aircraft. 
Airlines have often funded the acquisition o f aircraft by issuing debt, which is often 
needed in capital intensive businesses.
The airline industry’s debt load greatly exceeds U.S. industry averages. Aircraft are 
the airlines’ only money making equipment, and are among the most expensive machines 
in the world. For example, a Boeing 777 costs more than $130 million per aircraft 
(Chung, 1996). The general aging of the aircraft used means higher maintenance costs 
and eventual aircraft replacement. Stricter government regulations for older planes place 
further burdens on those carriers who use them.
Labor costs are the highest single cost for United (“United Airlines,” 2003). Many of 
the major airlines’ restrictive union agreements limit their flexibility in reducing labor 
costs. Lven Southwest has begun to experience labor problems, as employees have 
begun to demand higher pay levels. Southwest’s flight attendants spent over two years in 
negotiations with the airline to achieve their objectives o f improved pay and quality of 
life (“Airlines Brief,” 2004).
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As a result o f the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, airline insurance premiums 
have increased significantly. Commercial insurers cancelled airlines’ liability insurance 
for losses resulting from what was considered acts of war (i.e., terrorism, sabotage, 
hijacking, and other similar acts), but airlines have obtained replacement coverage 
through the FAA (“United Airlines,” 2003). There is no guarantee that the FAA will 
continue this coverage. Passenger security costs are also expected to rise.
Most o f the major airlines maintain their operations around a “hub-and-spoke” 
system. The spokes feed passengers from outlying points into a central airport, called the 
‘hub’, where passengers travel to additional hubs or to their final destination. 
Establishing a major hub in a city like Chicago or Atlanta is very expensive. It can cost 
as much as $150 million for real estate and staffing. Some low-cost airlines, however, 
have been operating differently. Unlike other major airlines. Southwest, a low-cost 
carrier, provides no fancy terminals, no costly hub-and-spoke operations, and no 
amenities (Chung, 1996). The low-cost airlines together now control over a quarter of 
domestic air capacity, they fly in the highest-demand markets, and their low fares are 
easy to find and book on the Internet (“America West,”2003).
The airline industry is highly competitive. Most of the regional carriers have lower 
costs structures than the major hub-and-spoke carriers. Both business and leisure 
travelers have become increasing price sensitive. The low-cost carriers continue to target 
and make inroads into markets that had been the domain of the network carriers, while 
network carriers have little flexibility to respond. The discount carriers have been able to 
thwart price hikes by the network carriers (“Airlines Rescinding,” 2004).
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In general, the airline industry is in a dire condition. It is dealing with the industry’s 
worst downturn in history. The airline industry has yet to fully recover. Ongoing fare 
cuts, declining traffic, and softness in the economy have kept the industry in a weakened 
condition. Having reviewed the economics of the airline industry, the next section of this 
chapter examines the Altman Z-Score bankruptcy prediction model.
Altman Z-Score Model 
The first study using financial ratios and multiple discriminant analysis to predict 
business failure was completed by Altman in his doctoral dissertation. The model that he 
developed correctly predicted 95 percent of manufacturing firm bankruptcies one year 
prior to failure. The model also correctly predicted 72 percent of manufacturing firm 
bankruptcies two years prior to failure (Altman, 1968).
According to Altman (1993), the detection o f company operating and financial 
difficulties is a subject which has been particularly amenable to analysis with financial 
ratios. Studies dating back to the 1930s concluded that failing firms exhibit significantly 
different ratio measures than do continuing entities. In general, ratios measuring 
profitability, liquidity, and solvency prevailed as the most significant indicators in these 
studies (Altman, 1968). Knowing which ratios to use in detecting bankruptcy potential, 
and what weights should be attached to those ratios, is a question that Altman and others 
have tried to answer. It is a central question that this study also investigates.
Altman used Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA), a statistical technique that 
identifies the differentiating characteristics of pre-determined groups. MDA is used to 
derive a discriminant function. The discriminant function is a linear equation using a
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combination o f independent variables. The independent variables, in Altman’s study, 
were financial ratios. This equation was used to differentiate the firms studied into one of 
two groups: either bankrupt or non-bankrupt. This analytical method has also been 
applied successfully in consumer credit evaluation, in which a discriminant function, 
using financial data as independent variables, classifies individuals into two groups— 
credit-worthy or non-credit-worthy (Wagner, Reichert, & Cho, 1983).
Altman started with a list of 22 potentially useful ratios for evaluation. The variables 
were classified into five traditional ratio categories; liquidity, cumulative profitability 
over time, productivity, solvency, and activity. The ratios were chosen on the basis of 
their popularity in the literature and their potential relevancy. Using the financial 
statements of 33 bankrupt corporations and 33 non-bankrupt corporations, Altman used 
step-wise multiple discriminant analysis to establish which ratios would contribute the 
most to an equation that would differentiate between the two groups. The analysis 
yielded a formula that used five of the original 22 ratios as independent variables: 
working capital/total assets (X i); retained earnings/total assets (X2); earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets (X3); market value of equity/book value of total liabilities 
(X4); and, sales/total assets (X5). Collectively, these five ratios were considered “best” in 
the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. This function, shown in Table 1, did the best job 
among the alternatives, which included numerous computer runs analyzing different ratio 
profiles.
The dependent variable, the Z-score, maximizes the difference between the bankrupt 
group and the non-bankrupt group. Altman found that firms with a Z-score of greater 
than 2.99 are classified into the non-bankrupt category, while firms with a Z-score below
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1.81 are classified as bankrupt. The area between 1.81 and 2.99 was considered a “gray 
area” because of the tendency for error classification. If  a single cutoff is desired, 
Altman suggested using a Z-score of 2.67 to classify a firm as either bankrupt or non­
bankrupt.
The final discriminant function was as follows in Altman’s original model (Altman, 
1968).
Table 1
Altman Z-Score Multiple Discriminant Analysis Model
Z = .0 1 2X 1 + .0 1 4X2 +.03 3X3 + .0 06X4 + .999X5 + 6
Where:
X] = working capital/total assets;
X2 = retained earnings/total assets;
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets;
X4 = market value of equity/book value of total liabilities;
X5 = sales/total assets; 
s = error term; and,
Z = overall index.
Each of the ratios included in the model is explained below. For each ratio, a larger 
Z-score correlates to non-bankruptcy; a smaller Z-score correlates to bankruptcy.
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The working capital/total assets ratio (Xi) is a measure of the net liquid assets of the 
firm relative to is total capitalization. A firm that has experienced consistent operating 
losses will have shrinking current assets relative to its total assets.
Retained earnings are thought of as earned surplus. According to Altman (1968), this 
measure of cumulative profitability over time implicitly considers the age of a firm. A 
relatively young firm will probably show a low retained earnings/total assets ratio (X2) 
because it has not had time to build up its cumulative profits. The incidence of failure is 
much higher in a firm’s early years.
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (X 3) is a measure of the 
productivity o f the firm’s assets. This ratio is the same as the traditional return on assets 
(using earnings before interest and taxes) ratio, which is an overall 
performance/profitability measure. Market value o f equity to book value of liabilities 
(X 4) is a measure that shows how much the firm’s assets can drop before its liabilities 
exceed its assets and the firm becomes insolvent. Sales to total assets (X5) measures the 
sales generating ability of the firm’s assets, which is an activity ratio.
The model was considered to be very accurate in classifying 95 percent of the total 
sample correctly one year prior to bankruptcy. The model correctly classified 72 percent 
of the total sample two years prior to the event. In some cases, bankruptcy was correctly 
predicted five years before the event. In addition to the general manufacturing, publicly 
held firm Z-score model, Altman later developed a variation of the model for privately 
held firms (the Z ’-score model) and for nonmanufacturing industrials (the Z”-score 
model).
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In 1993, Altman revised this five-variable model to the four-variable model shown 
below as Table 2 (Z”-score model). In revising the original model, he changed the X4 
variable to net worth (book value) divided by total liabilities. He also dropped the last 
variable, X5, and altered the coefficients of the dependent variables.
The Z”-Score Model follows (Altman, 1993).
Table 2
Altman Z ”-Score Model
Z" = 6.56 Xi + 3.26 X2 + 6.72 X3 + l.OSX, + é
Where;
X] = working capital/total assets;
X2 = retained earnings/total assets;
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets;
X4 = book value of equity/book value of total liabilities;
8 = error term; and,
Z” = overall index.
This newer model uses new cutoffs for classifying a firm as bankrupt or non­
bankrupt. A firm with a Z”-score o f more than 2.6 would be considered non-bankrupt; a 
firm with a score below 1.1 would be considered bankrupt. The firms that score between 
1.1 and 2.6 fall into the gray area, where classification is difficult (Altman, 1993).
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Both the Altman Z-Score and Z”-Score models do not include cash flow ratios. 
Altman stated the cash flow to debt ratio was not considered because of the lack of 
consistent and precise depreciation data. However, Beaver (1967) found that the cash 
flow to debt ratio was the best single ratio predictor of bankruptcy. Beaver stated that the 
larger a firm ’s net cash flow from operations, the smaller the probability of failure. Thus, 
it seems practical that a model that predicts financial distress/bankruptcy should also 
include cash flow ratios to test their predictive ability.
Since 1988, publicly traded firms have been required to issue a Statement of Cash 
Flows (SCF) with other financial statements released to external users (Schmidgall, 
2002). Investors and creditors use the SCF to assess the firm’s: (I) ability to pay its bills 
as they come due; (2) ability to pay dividends; and, (3) need for additional financing, 
including borrowing debt and selling capital stock. Since the SCF may contain 
information relevant to a prediction of failure or non-failure, it seems appropriate to 
include cash flow ratios in a new bankruptcy prediction model.
In their tests of the generalizability of the Z-score model, Grice and Ingram (2001) 
point out that researchers assume that the model is stable across economic conditions that 
change over time. However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, airline industry conditions 
have changed dramatically in recent years. Changing economic conditions can affect the 
accuracy, magnitude, and significance of the Z-Score coefficients (Mensah, 1984). 
Therefore, it is not likely that the Z-score model would perform equally well in all 
financial periods. These reasons suggest that a revised bankruptcy prediction model 
should be developed. Before doing so, however, this study will next discuss other 
bankruptcy prediction research in the airline industry.
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Studies of Airline Bankruptcies using the Altman Z-Score Model 
In 1981, Gritta (1982) accurately predicted that both Braniff and Continental would 
file for bankruptcy, using the Z-score model. Gritta, Davalos, and Chow (1996) used the 
Altman Z-Score Model to make airline Z-score comparisons over a very long time 
horizon. The carriers were divided in to two groups: those which remained solvent over 
the period o f the study, or which were solvent when merged; and, those which had failed 
one or more times. They found that the model separated the two groups fairly well.
Scaggs and Crawford (1986) revised the Altman Z-Score model, not on the dependent 
variable side, but on the independent variable side. They retained the single Z-score 
hurdle o f 2.67, but changed the weighting of the independent variables (i.e., the financial 
ratios). Their study determined that the debt position of a firm was a significant factor in 
predicting U.S. airline failure. In fact, many airlines hold high debt positions in their 
capital structure, along with commensurate high interest payments. Their revised model 
accurately predicted Braniff, Continental, and Air Florida’s bankruptcy three years prior 
to the event during the time period 1978-1982.
However, Golaszewski and Sanders (1992) contend that many U.S. carriers can 
continue to operate with lower than normal scores over the long haul. They state that 
when a Z-score falls below 1.0, the airline enters the range of concern. They also state 
that a score below 0.5 indicates financial distress and the need for financial restructuring. 
This cutoff is significantly lower than Altman’s Z-Score cutoff.
Davalos, Gritta, and Chow (1999) used the variables from Altman’s 1993 model, the 
Z”-Score model, but incorrectly used the cut-off scores from the 1968 Z-Score model in 
their research. Therefore, fourteen of their twenty-six classifications were incorrect.
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The results o f their study would have been the same, however, if  the classifications had 
been correct; their neural network approach outperformed the Z”-Score model in 
predicting U.S. carrier bankruptcy.
Gritta, Davalos, and Chow (2000) built on prior studies to use the Z-score model to 
track the performance o f the major air carriers over a 30-year period from 1966 to 1996. 
The purpose of their research was to asses the past and then-current health of the carriers. 
They stated that it also shed light on the importance of the debt burden in the industry, 
which has contributed to the industry’s instability over time. Next, the chapter turns to a 
discussion of other bankruptcy prediction models other than Altman’s models.
Other Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
Five other researchers, Beaver (1967), Deakin (1972), Edmister (1972), Blum (1974), 
and Ohlson (1980), also investigated and expanded the topic of bankruptcy prediction in 
firms. Their individual studies are discussed below.
One of the classic studies in the area of ratio analysis and bankruptcy prediction was 
completed by Beaver (1967). Beaver used univariate analysis to examine the ability of 
financial ratios to predict business failure. This study set the stage for the multivariate 
attempts, by Altman and others, which followed (Altman, 1993). Beaver found that a 
number of indicators could discriminate between matched samples of failed and 
nonfailed firms for as long as five years prior to firm failure.
It is remarkable to note that some researchers found that cash flow data added very 
little incremental value to a traditional accrual-based prediction model (Altman, 1993). 
Altman felt that information from accrual statements provided adequate information.
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However, Beaver found that the best performing ratio was cash flow to total debt. It thus 
seems appropriate to include a variety of ratios, including several cash flow rafios, fo 
gauge fhe recent performance of airlines, as many of the failed airlines applied for 
government-backed loans.
Beaver’s (1967) model was based on four propositions. First, the more net liquid 
assets a firm has, the smaller is the probability of its failure. Second, the larger the net 
cash flow from operations, the smaller the probability of its failure. Third, the larger the 
amount of debt a firm has, the greater the probability of its failure. Fourth, the larger the 
amount of liquid assets required to fund operating expenditures, the greater the 
probability o f its failure.
For each o f five years prior to its failure, Beaver calculated 30 ratios. The ratios were 
selected on the basis of three criteria; ( 1) popularity in the literature; (2) performance in 
previous studies; and, (3) definition of the ratio in terms of a “cash flow” concept. Based 
on the lowest prediction error for each group (failed and non-failed) over the five-year 
period, six variables performed “best” in Beaver’s (1967) study: (1) cash flow to total 
debt; (2) net income to total assets; (3) total liabilities to total assets; (4) working capital 
to total assets; (5) current ratio; and, (6) no-credit-interval.
Deakin’s (1972) study was developed to provide an alternative business failure model 
to the initial works o f Beaver and Altman. Deakin’s results, like Beaver’s, favored the 
use of the cash flow to total debt ratio as the best predictor o f bankruptcy. Another 
researcher, Edmister (1972), analyzed the financial ratios of small businesses to predict 
business failure. He defined a small business as one with a loan from the Small Business 
Administration (SBA). The ratios chosen were those previously used in studies by
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Beaver (1967), Altman (1968), and Blum (1974). However, he used a zero-one 
regression technique, in which the variables were transformed into categorical variables. 
His method included dividing a firm’s ratio by its respective industry average, then 
converting the result into a zero-one variable, depending on an arbitrary predetermined 
cutoff point. The concept of transforming the data into categorical variables is an 
interesting contribution to the research. Edmister’s (1972) bankruptcy prediction model 
is presented below as Table 3.
In Edmister’s model, a Z-score of less than 0.47 was used to predict a firm’s failure 
and a Z score of greater than 0.53 was used was used to predict a firm’s nonfailure. Z- 
scores between 0.47 and 0.53 were considered a gray zone where classification was 
difficult. The function predicted small business failure for 93 percent of the cases studied 
one year prior to the event.
The purpose of Blum’s (1974) study was to aid the antitrust division of the Justice 
Department by developing a model to assess the probability of business failure. Blum 
did this by analyzing the financial and market data o f failing firms. Like Beaver, he 
found that cash flow to total debt was the best predictor ratio. However, Blum did not 
publish his actual formulas.
Ohlson (1980) used a logit analysis technique to predict bankruptcy. He started with 
only nine ratios in his study, based on “simplicity.” Five of those ratios included total 
liabilities to total assets, working capital to total assets, current liabilities to current assets, 
net income to total assets, cash flow from operation to total liabilities. He also included 
data on net income and the size of the firm in terms of total assets. Ohlson (1980) found
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that the size o f the firm was the most important predictor in his model, and the firm’s 
financial structure was the second most important factor.
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Table 3
Edmister’s Small Business Failure Discriminate Function
Z = 0.951 -  0.523X, -  0.293X2 -  0.482X3 + 0.277X4 -  0.452Xs -  0.352Xg -  0.924X?
+ é
Where: Z = Overall Index;
X] = 1 if  annual funds flow/current liabilities< 0.05, or 
= 0 otherwise;
X2 = 1 if equity/sales < 0.07, or 
= 0 otherwise;
X3 = 1 if  (net working capital/sales)/industry average ratio < -0.02, or 
= 0 otherwise;
X4 = 1 if  (current liabilities/equity)/industry average ratio < 0.48, or 
= 0 otherwise;
X5 = 1 if  (inventory/sales)/industry average ratio < 0.04 and has shown an upward trend, 
or
= 0 otherwise;
Xô = 1 if quick ratio/industry average ratio < 0.34 and has shown a downward trend, or 
= 0 otherwise;
X7 = 1 if quick ratio/industry average ratio has shown an upward trend, or 
= 0 otherwise; and,
8 = error term.
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These six studies suggest that a new bankruptcy prediction model, using classic but 
previously uncombined ratios, could be developed to predict bankruptcy more accurately 
than in the past. This new model could be tested on bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines, 
using financial data for the six-year period 1998-2003. The ratios that would be included 
in this new model will be discussed next.
New Bankruptcy Prediction Model
This section of Chapter 2 discusses five financial ratio categories and how they relate 
to financial conditions in the airline industry. The first four financial ratio categories 
were used in Altman’s Z”-Score Model (1993) as predictors o f financial distress. These 
ratio categories are liquidity, cumulative profitability over time, productivity, and 
solvency. The last financial ratio category, cash flow, was found by Beaver (1967) to be 
the most important predictor o f financial distress.
Additionally, it may be appropriate to develop a new cut-off point for the airline 
industry. Few major carriers have maintained Z-score above 2.99 for extended periods. 
Many have operated for extended periods with Z-Scores close to 1.0 without entering 
bankruptcy (Golaszewski & Sanders, 1992). In part, developing a new Z-score cut off 
point for airlines stems from the fact that the federal government has often intervened to 
bail out troubled air carriers in an effort to keep the industry afloat.
Liquidity
The ability o f a firm to meet its current obligations is important in evaluating its 
financial position (Schmidgall, 2002). Liquidity ratios are crucial in any bankruptcy
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analysis of the airline industry, especially as they relate to debt service obligations. For 
example, in 2003, American Airlines was spending over 10 percent of its revenue on debt 
service obligations alone; thus, it was very close to filing bankruptcy.
The ATSB’s loan guarantees have helped provide assistance to US Airways, Frontier, 
and America West so that those airlines could meet their current financial obligations. 
United Airlines has been operating under bankruptcy protection since December 2002, 
after the ATSB rejected its original application for $1.8 billion in guarantees (Maynard, 
2004).
United has said it was likely to terminate its four employee pension plans. It has said 
that it will not make required contributions while it is in bankruptcy. In short. United has 
been unable to meet its current financial obligations. The threat has raised the ire of 
United’s unions (Maynard, 2004). United may shed some or all of its $13 billion in 
pension obligations as the only way to succeed in emerging from bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, the federal agency that insures pensions is facing a possible 
cascade of bankruptcies and pension defaults in the airline industry. Some experts fear 
that this could lead to a multi-billion dollar taxpayer bailout, similar to the savings and 
loan industry collapse and subsequent taxpayer bailout of the 1980’s.
Meanwhile, the entire industry almost certainly faces the prospect o f rising security- 
related costs above and beyond what it is already paying. Congress set aside an 
additional $100  million to compensate airlines for reinforcing airline cockpit doors. 
However, the industry continues to face ongoing costs related to heightened security. 
Airlines are now required either to screen all bags for explosives or to make sure each 
bag on a plane is matched up to a passenger seated on that flight. This is both time-
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consuming and expensive. Therefore, liquidity ratios should be included in any new 
bankruptcy prediction model for the airline industry.
Solvency
Solvency ratios measure the degree of debt financing used by a firm. These ratios 
reveal the equity cushion that is available to absorb any operating losses. An airline is 
solvent when its assets exceed its liabilities. High solvency ratios generally suggest that 
an operation can weather financial storms. For example. Continental’s $5 billion in debt 
is equal to half its total assets (Bonne, 2003). By comparison, the ratio of debt to equity 
for the airline industry for the first quarter of 2004 was 1.147 (Airline Overview, 2004).
Many airlines are carrying extremely high debt levels, at a time when investors are 
increasingly worried about balance sheet stability after the collapse o f such companies as 
Enron Corporation and MCI/WorldCom. For example. Delta ended the year 2002 with 
total debt of $10.0 billion and a debt to equity ratio of 92 percent, compared to 2001, 
when it had total debt of $9.4 billion and a debt to equity ratio of 71 percent. Before its 
bankruptcy filing in August 2002, US Airways Group’s debt to equity ratio was over 100 
percent, indicating negative stockholders’ equity (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).
A heavy debt burden contributes to the instability o f the airline industry. As a result 
o f their increased leverage and the increased volatility of earnings. People Express, 
Eastern, and Pan American were unable to compete, following the passage of the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 (Chow, Gritta, & Hockstein, 1988). Airlines currently 
operating with high leverage are similarly threatened.
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“The industry is burdened with a staggering load of debt and unable to obtain 
capital,” said Tony Velocci, editor-in-chief of Aviation Week & Space Technology, in 
his presentation “Air Safety: At What Cost?” (Stein, 2004). The network carriers have 
slashed capital spending in the past few years by about $8 billion (S&P’s CreditWeek, 
2004). With the ability to save $40-$50 million upfront on a new 737 aircraft, it is not 
surprising that leasing has allowed a handful of low-fare carriers to quickly build new 
fleets without assuming long-term debt burdens (Bonne, 2003). “It gives you a 
tremendous amount o f flexibility to manage through up and down markets,” says Bob 
Genise, president and CEO of Bouillioun Aviation Services. “Instead of making a 25- 
year decision, you can take it on for five years.” The only downside, analysts warn, is 
that leases have become a popular way for some carriers to hide debt off the balance 
sheet.
Carriers, however, facing their toughest market in years, simply cannot afford the 
lease payments as they exist in many o f the current contracts. If  an airline goes bankrupt 
or a lease is nearing the end of its term, lessors may have to renegotiate the contract or 
run the risk of planes parked in the desert (Bruch, 2003). Thus, it is clear that financial 
leverage (i.e., solvency) ratios should be incorporated in a bankruptcy prediction model 
for airlines.
Cumulative Profitability over Time 
The airlines’ current business model is under pressure, and it will have to change to 
restore profitability (Bruch, 2003). From 2001 through the second quarter of 2004, the
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industry will have lost more than $24 billion. When the business-travel boom ended in 
2001, revenue plunged but costs remained high (Johnson, WSJ, 10/05/2004).
Low-cost airlines now account for 29 percent of the domestic airline business, up 
from 7 percent of U.S. domestic air passengers in 1991. The rapid growth of the market 
share o f low-cost, low-fare carriers during the past few years is one of the most 
significant current trends in the industry, and is perceived as presenting a considerable 
threat to the viability of the network carriers. The largest low-fare carriers currently 
operating in the U.S. are Southwest, America West, AT A, JetBlue, AirTran, Spirit, and 
Frontier. The response of the network carriers to the growing low-fare challenge will be 
critical to determining the future structure of the U.S. airline industry (“The Airline 
Industry,” 2003).
The network airlines, for their part, have acknowledged that their cost structure is too 
high in comparison to low-cost carriers. “Network” is used to describe airlines like 
United, Northwest, Delta, US Airways, and Continental that operate extensive hub and 
spoke systems (Jenkins, 2004). The big hubs are costly in terms o f real estate, staffing, 
and flight delays (Carey, 2004).
Fuel expenses - the second largest financial drain on airlines’ operating budgets - are 
apt to remain near historical highs for the foreseeable future. At the time of this writing, 
oil prices have reached an astronomical $50 per barrel. In just the past year, oil prices 
have risen 75 percent. The network carriers in the past few years have done a remarkable 
job of reining in operating costs, which are down by $13.4 billion, but runaway fuel 
prices have negated much of those savings.
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With fuel at an all-time high, network airlines made over 12 attempts to boost airfares 
in the first quarter of 2004. However, most o f these efforts have failed to stick. 
Increasingly, the spoiler has been one or more low-fare airlines, which see a chance to 
extend their market shares by not raising their prices. For travelers, this change in pricing 
power could affect everything from ticket prices to the financial viability of the big 
airlines tbey use, to whether they must continue to endure unpopular restrictions, such as 
Saturday-night-stayover requirements, to get low fares (Carey, 2004).
Behind the price erosion is a weak economy; business travelers have moved to 
cheaper, restricted tickets and the growth of Southwest and its imitators. US Airways 
said that 70 percent of its domestic flying in 2003 was unprofitable. David Siegel, the 
chief executive, said in a speech to employees, “If we could charge more money, we 
would, but passengers want low fares” (Carey, 2004). Therefore, it seems evident that 
cumulative firm profitability is an important factor to consider in an airline bankruptcy 
model.
Productivity
The measure of the produetivity of an airline’s assets ean be obtained my dividing 
earnings before interest and taxes by total assets. Sinee a firm’s ultimate existence is 
based on the earning power of its assets, this ratio is particularly appropriate for studies 
dealing with corporate failure. Furthermore, insolvency in a bankruptcy sense occurs 
when the total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of the firm’s assets with value determined 
by the earning power of the assets (Altman, 1968).
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The largest single expense item for all airlines is labor, over 40 percent of total costs 
for some airlines (Baggaley, 2003). In 2002, Southwest had costs per employee of 
$59,100, according to industry consultant Vaughn Cordle. At the same time, the top five 
network carriers averaged in payroll costs $95,500 per employee (Jenkins, 2004). The 
network carriers also have senior work forces compensated at the top of union scale 
(Carey, 2004). To address these problems, the network carriers have sought substantial 
wage and produetivity adjustments from their unions, with those that have filed for 
bankruptey, or are teetering on the edge. They have generally won concessions from 
them, with the exception o f US Airways, which filed for bankruptey a second time on 
September 12, 2004 after failing to achieve desired wage concessions from their labor 
unions. In addition, the major carriers have cut tens o f billions o f dollars in expenses, 
have laid off over 110,000 employees, and have taken several hundred aircraft out of 
service since September 2001, according to AT A President and CEO James May 
(Maynard, 2004; Baggaley, 2003).
The difference in the cost structures between network airlines like United and low- 
fare carriers like Southwest reflect substantial differences in the productivity of both 
aircraft and employees. Low-fare carriers typically operate “point-to-point” networks in 
which they can minimize aircraft ground times, in contrast to the hub-and-spoke 
networks of most network airlines. Shorter ground times translate directly into higher 
aircraft utilization rates (“The Airline Industry,” 2003). At the same time, Southwest’s 
operating cost per available seat mile, for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, was 7.5 
cents per available seat mile. United’s operating cost per available seat mile was 11.5
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cents, and US Airways was 12 cents. These differences are dramatic in an industry 
where cost control is of paramount importance (Baggaley, 2003).
The Internet has had a profound effect on the way airlines price and distributing their 
product. By selling tickets online, airlines have dramatically cut distribution costs. On 
the other hand, the Internet has also led to more competitive pricing. The Internet’s 
appeal for airlines is apparent. A commercial Web site can be kept open for business 24 
hours a day, seven days a week. Southwest Airlines reported in 2002 that their Internet 
bookings cost them about one dollar to make, while their cost to book with a travel agent 
is between $6 and $8 . Tickets booked through Southwest’s own agents cost several 
dollars. On the down side, however, the Internet may ultimately hurt airline profitability 
by making travelers too price-sensitive. It is very simple for the traveler to go online and 
compare prices of competitors. This makes it difficult for airlines to try to raise their 
fares. Both business travelers, formerly high fare-paying, and budget travelers, can make 
low-price flight arrangements on line (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). Thus, a 
bankruptcy prediction model for airlines should likely include a productivity measure.
Cash Flow
Cash flow relates to the actual cash generated and paid by the firm. Operating cash 
flow is the net of cash inflows relafed to revenues and cash outflows for operational cash 
expenditures, including payments for salaries, wages, taxes, supplies, and interest on 
debt. Operating cash flow is found in a firm’s SCF. The SCF helps people to asses a 
firm’s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations. The ratio o f operating cash
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flows to total liabilities should be relatively high; that is, the cash flow from operations 
should be high relative to the firm’s total liabilities (Schmidgall, 2002).
Accounting income is not the relevant source of value in a firm. Cash flow is the 
ultimate source of value for the firm, since only cash can be spent to cover expenses 
(Moyer, McGuigan & Kretlow, 2001). An airline needs sufficient cash on hand to cover 
interest payments and other liquidity needs. Delta’s chief executive, Gerald A. Grinstein, 
said, “We must not just have costs in line with our competitors, we must have cash flow.” 
(Maynard, 2004).
Given the high debt levels carried by many airlines, and the frequency of large 
operating losses due to industry cycles, it is important to look at operating cash flow to 
assess the strength of an airline to weather financial storms. During times of industry 
losses, it is important to determine how quickly an airline may be using its available cash, 
its cash bum rate. In 2001 and 2002, for example, many airlines were burning though 
millions of dollars in cash each day. In such cases, it is important to gauge how long an 
airline can withstand a downturn and remain solvent (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).
With losses mounting following a sharp drop-off in travel in the months after 
September 2001, most of the carriers were forced to shoulder new debt, tapping their 
credit lines and/or issuing bonds to respond to the rapid depletion o f their available cash. 
These actions were vital to help the carriers survive, as passenger levels declined 
dramatically, fares dropped, and losses increased sharply.
President Bush signed into law the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations 
Act on April 16, 2003, after fierce lobbying by the airline industry. The airlines 
contended that costs of the war in Iraq and government-mandated security measures were
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harming the industry. Under the Act, the Transportation Security Administration 
(T.S.A.) disbursed pretax cash payments totaling $2.29 billion in May 2003. These 
payments were intended to reimburse the carriers for security fees they had paid to the 
T.S.A. since February 2002. As a result of the cash grants, most of the top ten carriers 
reported a profit in the second quarter of 2003. However, after stripping out the cash 
grants, most airlines would have reported sizable losses (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). 
For example, US Airways, in the second quarter of 2003 (its first full quarter since 
emerging from bankruptcy), reported profits of $13 million, but this reported figure 
included $216 million in government aid. If this grant were omitted, the company would 
instead have lost $188 million for the quarter.
Without the grants, more of the major carriers might have been forced to file for 
bankruptcy protection, and United and US Airways would have filed sooner. In some 
cases, the direct cash grants may have only served to delay the inevitable bankruptcy 
filing. Thus, it seems clear that a bankruptcy model for airlines should include a cash 
flow measure. Next, this chapter concludes with a brief commentary on the future 
outlook for the airline industry.
Future Outlook
What will likely emerge in the airline industry over time is a domestic market with 
several large, low-cost/low-fare airlines and several large, hub-and-spoke airlines (or 
perhaps several alliances of such carriers) competing for passengers. Such an outcome 
implies ongoing costs pressures on the network carriers, but not their total extinction 
(Baggaley, 2003). In any case, it seems evident that the industry is at a turning point - it
41
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
could well be on the brink of a major industry restructuring that includes the bankruptcy, 
liquidation, and/or consolidation of several major network carriers (“The Airline 
Industry,” 2003). Thus, the development of a new bankruptcy prediction model for the 
airline industry might be very timely and useful. If the model can truly be predictive in 
nature, it could provide guidance for the many parties who are interested in the industry’s 
survival.
Summary
This chapter developed the theoretical background for testing Altman’s Z”-score 
model on airlines, and for creating a new bankruptcy prediction model. The next chapter 
discusses the proposed methodology for utilizing multiple discriminate analysis in this 
dissertation, and for performing the remainder o f the research that is proposed in this 
dissertation.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to test an existing bankruptcy prediction 
model, the Altman Z”-score model (Z”-score model) on airline firms, using financial 
ratios for the period 1998-2003. A second objective of this study was to develop a new 
bankruptcy prediction model, using airline financial ratios derived from the financial 
statements for years 1998-2003. A new bankruptcy prediction model needed to 
differentiate between airlines that were likely to go bankrupt and those that were not 
likely to go bankrupt. For it to be effective, this new model needed to predict bankruptcy 
more accurately than the Z”-score model. The new model also required either a higher 
classification rate, or needed to predict bankruptcy earlier, than the existing Z”-score 
model.
A possible outcome of this study was that a new model did not predict bankruptcy 
more accurately than the Z”-score model. The Z”-score model might have offered a 
superior classification rate, and may have been able to predict bankruptcy earlier than the 
new model. If  so, then this dissertation will have provided further support for the use of 
the existing Z”-score model.
This chapter discusses the methodology that will be used to test the models described 
above. It begins with a discussion of the research design, including the selection of firms
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used in the sample. It continues by explaining the principal methodology employed 
herein to test the bankruptcy prediction models, which is Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
(MDA), and identifies the major issues involved in the application of MDA. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion on how to validate the results of MDA.
Research Design
Altman (1993) states that, ideally, one would like to develop a bankruptcy prediction 
model utilizing a homogeneous group of bankrupt companies and data as near to the 
present as possible. This dissertation seeks to do that, consistent with Altman’s 
guidelines. The analyses in this study used bankrupt and non-bankrupt airline firms’ 
1998-2003 financial statements. The financial statements were retrieved from the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) website, www.sec.gov. using the EDGAR 
database, and from airline firms’ annual reports which were available on-line from the 
individual companies’ websites. All publicly held U.S. companies are required to file 
their financial statements with the SEC.
Bankrupt companies, for the purposes o f this study, were defined as those meeting 
one of the following conditions: (1) in Chapter 11 bankruptcy; or, (2) in Chapter 7 
liquidation. Thus, those airline firms that were in one or more of these states at any time 
during the 1998-2004 time period were considered to be bankrupt.
Selection of Firms
Only publicly held airlines were selected for this study, as the financial reports of 
these firms are readily available. Privately held companies are not required to make their
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
financial statements available to the public. Their financial reports are more difficult to 
obtain; therefore, they were not included in this dissertation. This study used a census 
approach, rather than random sample.
Major and National Airline Carriers 
Only major and national airlines were selected for this study. Major airlines, or 
majors, are a group of large, certified air carriers that have annual operating revenues 
over $ 1 billion. National airlines, or nationals, are a group of large, certified air carriers 
that have annual operating revenues of $100 million to $1 billion.
The major passenger airlines include Alaska, America West, American, Continental, 
Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA, United, and US Air. They are all publicly owned and 
were included in this study. Air Canada was also included in this study, as it has 
sufficiently large revenues, and uses Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
in preparing its financial statements, like publicly owned U.S. firms. Also, Air Canada 
stock is sold on the American Stock Exchange. Non-passenger airlines (DHL, Federal 
Express, and United Parcel Service) were not included in this study. Publicly owned 
national passenger airlines included in this study were AirTran (formerly Valu Jet), AT A 
(formerly Amtran), Frontier, Hawaiian, and JetBlue.
Network and Low-Cost Carriers 
The Bureau o f Transportation Statistics [BTS] (2004) listed the following airlines as 
network carriers in 2004: Alaska; American; Continental; Delta; Northwest; United; and 
US Airways. All o f these carriers were included in this study. Trans World Airlines
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(TWA), which flew its last official flight December 1, 2001, was also a network carrier. 
As TWA was still operating during part of the 1998-2004 time period, was also included 
in this study.
The BTS (2004) listed the following as low-cost carriers: AirTran; ATA; America 
West; Frontier; JetBlue; Southwest; and Spirit. Spirit Airlines is not publicly owned and 
its financial statements are difficult to obtain. Thus, it was not included in this study. The 
other low-cost carriers were included herein. Therefore, this dissertation included 
financial data from a total of 16 airline firms over a 6-year period.
Time Frame o f the Study
The time frame selected for this study was the period 1998-2004. It was during this 
period that the airline industry had seen its most turbulent times in its history. In 1998, 
air carriers were earning record profits. However, since 2000, a soft economy, increased 
competition, and rising fuel and labor costs and increased security costs cut into airline 
profits. By 2002, only 2 of the major carriers. Southwest and JetBlue, earned a profit. 
Most o f the largest carriers in the United States (US) suffered their third consecutive year 
of heavy losses in 2003. As of 2004, US airline industry had accumulated over $30 
billion in losses since 2000 (McCartney, 2004).
As discussed in Chapter 2, US airlines found themselves in a struggle on several 
fronts. The airlines now face a true challenge from low-cost entrants who have molded a 
completely different, and profitable, way of doing business; further, they are not upstarts, 
but well-established and successful companies (Bonne, 2003). The airline industry has 
been changing rapidly. Six publicly owned US major and national airlines went bankrupt
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during the time period of 1998-2004, as will be discussed in this chapter. At the time of 
this writing, 2004 financial statements were not yet publicly available. Therefore, the 
1998-2003 period seemed to be an appropriate one to use for testing the Z”-score model, 
which is a model developed specifically for the prediction of non-manufacturing 
corporate bankruptcies. In this dissertation, the same airline firms’ data set was used to 
formulate a revised model. This new model was also tested to determine its ability to 
predict airline firm bankruptcy. Altman (1993) stated that a bankruptcy prediction model 
should use a homogeneous group of bankrupt companies and data as near to the present 
time as possible. This dissertation did that, consistent with Altman’s guidelines.
Sample Selection and Size
During the period 1998-2004, the following six airline firms were liquidated or filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy: Air Canada; ATA; Hawaiian; TWA; United; and, US Air. Of 
these firms, four are majors, and two are nationals. One o f these six firms is a low-cost 
carrier. During the same time period, the following ten firms were not liquidated, nor did 
they file for Chapter II  bankruptcy: Air Tran; Alaska; America West; American; 
Continental; Delta; Frontier; JetBlue; Northwest; and. Southwest. O f these II  firms, 
seven are majors, and four are nationals. Five of these ten firms are also low-cost 
carriers.
In the period of this study, the above sixteen firms would have filed a total of 96 
annual reports, which would have resulted in 96 individual observations. However, 
TWA stopped operating in December 2001, so there are fewer than three years of 
available financial data for TWA. Also, JetBlue did not become a publicly traded entity
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until 2002, but three years of financial data are available for 2001 through 2003. 
Additionally, Air Canada’s 1998 financial reports are not publicly available. Therefore, a 
total of 90 observations were available as the data set for this study.
This sample size was adequate, given the statistical method chosen. MDA is quite 
sensitive to the ratio of sample size to the number of predictor variables. Hair et al. 
(1998) state that many studies suggest a ratio of 20 observations for each predictor 
variable. Altman’s (1993) model uses only four variables, which would have required at 
least 80 observations, so that ratio is achieved. Further, the specified 20 to one ratio 
could be nearly achieved for a new five-variable model, and would only fall ten 
observations short o f the desired total o f 100 in this case. Also, at a minimum, the 
sample size o f the smaller group should exceed the number of predictor variables 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The sample size of the smaller group was 33, which greatly 
exceeded the number of variables to be used in either the Altman (1993) model, or the 
new model. Therefore, the sample size and the group size were both adequate for 
purposes of this dissertation. The sample size of the larger group was 57. Multiple 
discriminant analysis is a one-way analysis and no special problems are posed by unequal 
sample sizes in groups. In the next section, assumptions o f MDA are covered.
Assumptions of Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Hair et al. (1998) state that it is desirable to meet certain conditions for proper 
application o f MDA. The key assumptions for deriving the discriminant function are 
multivariate normality of the independent variable and equal covariances. MDA is 
relatively robust to failures o f normality, if  skewness rather than outliers causes the
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violation. Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) state that robustness is expected with 20 cases in 
the smallest group if there are only five or fewer predictors. Therefore, in this case, with 
27 cases in the smallest group and five or fewer predictors, robustness to any failures in 
normality of the residuals should be expected.
However, MDA is highly sensitive to outliers. Therefore, a test for outliers in the 
data set for each group was run. To check for outliers, Mahalanobis’ distance was 
computed. Any outliers were then examined individually. Outliers were not expected 
among the financial ratio values.
MDA assumes linear relationships among all pairs of predictors within each group. 
Where a curvilinear relationship exists, it may be corrected by transforming some of the 
predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Unequal covariance matrices can have an adverse affect on the classification process. 
This effect can be minimized by using an adequate sample size (Hair et al., 1998). A 
Levene test determines whether the variances are approximately equal.
Multicollinearity can be expected among the variables, as the all of the financial 
ratios come from the same source, financial statements. This analysis did not use a 
stepwise procedure, but a simultaneous variable entry, to examine the power of all of the 
variables altogether (Hair et ah, 1998).
In classification, a decision was required as to whether one wants the a priori 
probabilities o f assignment to groups to be influenced by sample size (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). It was decided that the probability with which a case is assigned to a group 
should reflect the sample sizes of the two groups. The larger group, the non-bankrupt 
group, included ten firms. The smaller group, the bankrupt group, included six firms.
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Therefore, a naïve prediction of the probability of airline bankruptcy was six out of 
sixteen, or 37.5 percent.
Statistical Methodology
An appropriate statistical technique was selected in order to analyze the financial 
ratios and develop the differentiation model required for bankruptcy prediction. In order 
to select an appropriate method, the model assumptions were examined, relative to the 
information to be analyzed. MDA is the quantitative method that was selected for the 
purposes o f this dissertation. MDA is a sophisticated quantitative method of data 
analysis that predicts group membership (e.g., bankrupt or non-bankrupt) from a set of 
predictors (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In this dissertation, the predictors were a set of 
financial ratios that measured a firm’s liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity, 
solvency, and cash flow. Using MDA, the airlines included in this study were classified 
into either one o f two groups, bankrupt or non-bankrupt. A significant difference 
between the two groups, bankrupt or non-bankrupt, implies that one can predict whether 
a firm will be bankrupt in one, two, or even three years, depending upon the score that the 
firm receives from the application of MDA. Thus, the primary statistical problem in this 
research was one o f classifying an individual business as a member o f one o f two classes, 
bankrupt or non-bankrupt, based upon the ratio variables that were identified as being key 
to their ultimate success. As in the studies cited in Chapter 2, MDA is used to form a 
linear model that classifies individual firms based on their historical financial ratios.
MDA is principally used to classify and to make predictions in situations where the 
criterion variable is in categorical form, as was the case in this study (e.g., bankrupt
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versus non-bankrupt). A categorical variable is one that uses values that serve as a label 
or means of identification (Hair et ah, 1998). The statistical software used in this 
dissertation was SPSS-Version 12.0. SPSS offers statistics including: W ilks’ Lambda 
(only variables that are well below 1.0 reflect an ability to discriminate); statistical 
significance of each discriminator; and, univariate F-ratio for each predictor or financial 
ratio (Meidan & Chiu, 1995). This information is important in identifying which ratios 
do the best job of differentiating between a bankrupt airline company and a non-bankrupt 
airline firm.
To validate the model, a split (sometimes called “hold-out) sample approach is 
suggested when there are at least 100 in the total sample (Hair et ah, 1998). However, 
according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), jackknifed (or “leave one out”) classification 
gives a more realistic estimate of the ability o f the predictors to separate groups. In 
jackknifed classification, the data from the firm are left out when the coefficients used to 
assign it to a group are computed. This study adopted the approach recommended by 
Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) and uses jackknifed classification for the analysis.
Either a simultaneous or sequential computational approach can be used to derive a 
discriminant function (Hair et al, 1998). The simultaneous approach was utilized on the 
four variables used in the Altman Z”-score model and on the new model.
After the new discriminant function for the new model has been computed, a t-test 
was performed. This determined whether the two groups’ scores were significantly 
different
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Computation of Ratios
All three o f the major financial statements were used in this study; namely, the 
balance sheet, the income statement, and the statement o f cash flows. The balance sheet 
is a major financial statement that is prepared at the end of each accounting period. The 
relevant period of time, for purposes of this study, was one year. The balance sheet 
reflects the financial position of the firm— its assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity— at a 
given date (Schmidgall, 2002).
The income statement reports the success of the firm’s operations for period of time. 
In this study, the relevant period of time was one year. The income statement shows the 
amount of revenues that the firm earned and the amount o f expenses that were incurred in 
earning those revenues (Schmidgall, 2002).
The statement of cash flows shows the effects on cash of a business’s operating, 
investing, and financing activities for the period. The relevant period o f time, in this 
study, was one year. The statement of cash flows explains the change in cash from the 
beginning o f the year to the end of the year (Schmidgall, 2002).
The liquidity ratio used in the Z”-score model was working capital divided by total 
assets. Working capital is defined as current assets minus current liabilities. This 
information can be obtained from each firm’s balance sheet. Cumulative profitability, in 
Altman’s (1993) model, was defined as retained earnings divided by total assets. This 
information can also be obtained from each firm’s balance sheet.
The productivity ratio used in Altman’s model (1993) was earnings before interest 
and taxes, divided by total assets. This ratio is also known as gross return on assets. The
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earnings information is found on each firm’s income statements, and the total assets 
figure is found on each firm’s balance sheet.
The solvency ratio used by Altman was net worth, or owners’ equity, divided by total 
liabilities. This is the same as the inverse of the traditional debt-to-equity ratio. These 
figures are found on each firm’s balance sheet.
Lastly, cash flow ratios can be included in a new bankruptcy prediction model. 
Beaver (1967), Deakin (1972), and Blum found that the ratio of cash flow to total debt 
was significant in predicting bankruptcy. Cash flow from operations data can be obtained 
from each firm’s statement of cash flows. The net cash flow from operating activities 
figure, for each firm, for each year, was used. Total firm debt is found on the balance 
sheet.
Analysis of Results
Once the variables (financial ratios) were identified, as discussed above, the ratios for 
the Z”-score model and the new model were computed. Applying the formula(s) for each 
model to the ratios yielded the appropriate score, or Z”-score, for each firm.
The Z”-score model produces one score for each company for each year. In Altman’s 
1993 study, he determined that firms with a score o f less 1.10 were failed and that firms 
with a score o f greater than 2.60 were not failed. Scores between 1.10 and 2.60 were not 
consistently failed or non-failed and required further investigation. These same cutoff 
values were used to accomplish the initial classification under the new model in this 
study.
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The firms were first grouped into two groups, either bankrupt or non-bankrupt, 
according to their actual status. The Z”-scores were then computed. Using the computed 
Z”-scores, each firm within each group was then put into a second group that indicated 
one of three possible results of the test: bankrupt, non-bankrupt, or unclassified (the grey 
area). The results were then presented in a “prediction accuracy matrix” format adapted 
from the classification matrix format used by Altman (1993) to evaluate his study. One 
must construct classification matrices to determine the predictive ability of a discriminant 
function.
An analysis o f the predictive ability o f the model was then completed; that is, an 
assessment was made as to whether the model correctly predicted the firm’s status, failed 
to predict the firm’s status, or was unable to predict the firm’s status. The model’s 
accuracy was determined based on the percentage of the firms that were correctly 
classified into these categories. Therefore, there were three separate measures for 
accuracy: the percentage o f bankrupt firms classified as bankrupt; the percentage of non­
bankrupt firms classified as non-bankrupt, and the percentage of all the firms that were 
properly classified. These results are reported in Chapter 4 of this study.
The frequency of non-classification also impacts the utility o f the model. If the 
model is unable to predict bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy, further analysis is required. 
While additional analysis is always appropriate before making decisions, the model does 
not add any value to the analysis if  it does not produce a classification (Patterson, 2001).
For each model involved in this dissertation (i.e., the Z”-score model, and the Kroeze 
model), a prediction accuracy matrix was created showing the number and percentage of 
correct classifications and incorrect classifications. An example of an accuracy matrix is
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shown in Table 4 (Altman, 1993). For example, in the first row, one can see that 33 firms 
are actually bankrupt. The model correctly classified 30 of the firms as bankrupt. 
Therefore, the model was correct in predicting bankruptcy 90.9 percent of the time. The 
model was also correct in predicting non-bankruptcy 97 percent of the time.
Table 4
Prediction Accuracy Matrix
Classified
Actual Bankrupt Non-bankrupt Total
Bankrupt
Non-bankrupt
Total
30(90dM4] 
1 (3.0%) 
31 (100%)
3 (9.1%) 
32 (97.0%; 
35 (100%)
33
33
66
Source: Altman, 1993
Since this study used six bankrupt and ten non-bankrupt firms, a simple random 
classification of a firm as bankrupt or would be accurate six-sixteenths or 37.5 percent of 
the time. This type o f classification is called a naïve selection, and the added utility of 
the models being evaluated was determined by how much better they predict bankruptcy 
or non-bankruptcy than a naïve prediction. This was determined by performing a chi- 
square test on the classification matrix.
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Once the accuracy of each model was determined, the overall results of each model 
were compared to determine which model was the better predictor o f bankruptcy in the 
airline industry. The results of each model were also evaluated against a naïve model
The new model, or Kroeze model, was considered to be better than the Altman Z”- 
score model if  it correctly predicted airline firm bankruptcy by at least one firm more 
than the Altman Z”-score model. For example, given that five airline firms have gone 
bankrupt, if  the Altman Z”-score model correctly predicted which three airline firms will 
go bankrupt three years before the event, the Kroeze model needed to correctly predict 
which four airlines would go bankrupt, three years before the event.
Thus, HI was tested by performing a chi-square test on the classification matrix that 
compared the Altman Z”-score to a naïve model. H2 was tested by performing a chi- 
square test on the classification matrix that compared the Altman Z”-score model to the 
Kroeze model. The hypotheses are reviewed below.
Restatement o f Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are as follows:
Hlo: There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the 
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
HI*: There is a relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2q: a  revised bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”- 
score model in predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
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H2a: a  revised bankruptcy prediction model is better than the Altman Z”-score 
model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
The Altman Z”-score model (1993) is shown below in Table 5.
Table 5
Altman Z ”-Score Model
Z" = 6.56 X, + 3.26 X; + 6.72 X3 + 1.05X4 + A
Where:
X] = working capital/total assets;
X2 = retained eamings/total assets;
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets;
X4 = book value of equity/book value of total liabilities; 
s = error term; and,
Z” = overall index.
Reliability and Validity Issues 
Reliability and validity were not directly at issue in this dissertation. Reliability 
involves the extent to which the set of variables is consistent in what the set is intended to 
measure (Hair et al., 1998). Validity encompasses the idea of how well the concept is 
defined by the measures (Hair et al., 1998). This study did not collect primary data by 
means o f a survey instrument; instead, it used secondary data from public sources to test
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the models that were under scrutiny herein. Thus, reliability and validity were not major 
issues that have to be considered during the conduct of this study.
Summary
This chapter presented the research methodology that is involved in this dissertation. 
The research process involved in testing a bankruptcy prediction model was discussed. 
Next, issues relating to sample selection and sample size were discussed. This was 
followed by a discussion of the methodology to be used in the study (MDA). Finally, the 
methods for conducting statistical analyses on the data were addressed. The results of the 
application o f these methods are discussed in the succeeding chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of the analysis and the hypothesis testing for the 
data that were collected as discussed in Chapter 3. The first section of the chapter 
examines the issues of prediction accuracy of the models that were tested in this 
dissertation. The next section uses chi-square analysis to test the models’ predictive 
ability. The last section discusses testing o f the data set that was used in this study, 
including the treatment o f unequal sample sizes and missing data, and an examination of 
possible normality, outlier variables, linearity, variance, and collinearity issues.
Prediction Accuracy
There were six bankrupt firms and ten non-bankrupt firms. The bankrupt firms were 
coded one. The non-bankrupt firms were coded two. There were a total of 90 cases used 
to calculate a discriminant function. The 90 cases were obtained from 1998 through 2003 
financial reports, include five Air Canada cases (1999 through 2003), six Hawaiian Air 
cases (1998 through 2003), four TWA cases (1998 through 2001), six US Airways cases 
(1998 through 2003), six United cases (1998 through 2003), six America West cases 
(1998through 2003), six Frontier cases (1998 through 2003), six Alaska cases (1998 
through 2003), six American cases (1998 through 2003), six Continental cases
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(1998 through 2003), six Northwest cases (1998 through 2003), six Southwest cases 
(1998 through 2003), three JetBlue cases (1998 through 2003), six Delta cases (1998 
through 2003), six ATA cases (1998 through 2003), and six Air Tran cases (1998 through 
2003).
Consistent with the methodology described in Chapter 3, Altman Z”-Score model (Z” 
Model) scores were calculated. The discriminant function for the Z” model was used to 
calculate a Z” score for each case. For example. Air Canada’s Z” scores were -5.22 in 
2003, -2.62 in 2002, -2.16 in 2001, -1.04 in 2000, and -.06 in 1999.
The airlines used in this study were then classified as bankrupt, non-bankrupt, or in 
the grey area, according to the Z” Model and using the appropriate cutoff values that 
were suggested by prior research, as discussed in Chapter 2. The cutoffs were; less than 
1.1, classified as bankrupt; greater than 2 .6 , classified as non-bankrupt; and between 1.1 
and 2.6, in the grey area. Air Canada filed for bankruptcy in 2003. Therefore, Air 
Canada would have been correctly classified as bankrupt in 2002, one year ahead of the 
event; in 2001 , two years ahead of the event; in 2000 , three years ahead of the event; and 
in 1999, four years ahead of the event. There were a total o f 23 cases for which a 
classification could be made one year, two years, three years, and four years ahead of a 
bankruptcy filing. Therefore, four o f the 23 cases corresponded to Air Canada.
There were a total o f 39 cases from firms that did not file for bankruptcy. Southwest, 
for example, had Z” scores greater than 2.6 for every year in this study. Therefore, 
Southwest would have been correctly classified as non-bankrupt in 2003 (one year before 
the most recent financial period), 2002  (two years before the most recent financial period)
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2001 (three years before the most recent financial period), and 2000  (four years before 
the most recent financial period). Four of the 39 cases corresponded to Southwest.
The table below (Table 6 lists the airlines, the financial statement dates (years 
inclusive) used for calculating the financial ratios and classification scores, and the 
number of cases that each airline contributed. There were a total of 62 cases.
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Table 6
Airlines, Financial Statement Dates, and Cases
Airline Financial Statement Dates Number i
ATA 2000 to 2003 4
Air Canada 1999 to 2002 4
Air Tran 2000 to 2003 4
America West 2000 to 2003 4
American 2000 to 2003 4
Alaska 2000 to 2003 4
Continental 2000 to 2003 4
Delta 2000 to 2003 4
Frontier 2000 to 2003 4
Hawaiian 1999 to 2002 4
JetBlue 2001 to 2003 3
Northwest 2000 to 2003 4
Southwest 2000 to 2003 4
TWA 1998 to 2000 3
US Airways 1998 to 2001 4
United 1998 to 2001 4
Table 7 (and the subsequent tables 8 through 11) is interpreted by reading across each 
row. For example, in Table 7 the number of airline firms that were actually bankrupt and
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the model correctly predicted their bankrupt status was 23. There were a total of 23 cases 
of actual bankruptcy. Therefore, 23 correct out of a total o f 23 equals 100 percent 
correctly predicted. However, only 7 firms that were actually non-bankrupt were 
correctly classified as non-bankrupt. There were a total of 39 cases of non-bankruptcy. 
Therefore, 7 correct out of a total of 39 equals 17.9 percent correctly predicted. Overall 
accuracy is calculated by adding the number of correctly classified firms, 7 plus 23, and 
dividing that by the total number o f cases, 23 plus 39. Overall accuracy, then, was 30 
divided by 62, or 48.4 percent.
Table 7
Altman Z "Score  Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix
Actual Bankrupt
Classified
Non-bankrupt Grey Area Total
Bankrupt 23 0 0 23
( 100%) (0%) (0%)
Non-bankrupt 26 7 6 39
(66.7%) (17.9%) (15.4%)
Total 49 7 6 62
( 100%) ( 100%) ( 100%)
Source: Altman, 1993
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The Z”-score model, as shown in Table 7, had no errors in classifying the bankrupt 
firms. All of the bankrupt firms were correctly classified by the Z” model as bankrupt. 
However, there were serious errors among the non-bankrupt firms using this model. 
Only 17.9 percent o f the non-bankrupt firms were correctly classified as non-bankrupt. 
Furthermore, 15.4 percent of the cases fell into the grey area and could not be classified 
without further analysis. Thus, these cases represent serious flaws in using the Z” model 
to predict bankruptcy.
A naïve approach would predict that 37.1 percent (23/62) of the cases should be 
classified as bankrupt. This is quite close to a naïve prediction of 37.5 percent, which is 
calculated by dividing 6 , the number of bankrupt firms, by the total number of firms, 16. 
Thus, the Altman Z”-score model (Z” model), although it appears to be superior to a 
naïve prediction, is not very accurate at predicting airline corporate bankruptcy for the 
years 1998-2004.
Next, Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) was performed using the same four 
financial ratios as predictors of bankruptcy. MDA was performed using SPSS 12.0; all 
four predictors were simultaneously forced into the equation. The predictor variables 
used were Xi, X%, X3, and X4, as in the Z” model. The results of MDA were statistically 
significant, and the classification accuracy was considerably higher than that of the Z” 
model. However, the coefficient for variable X3 was a negative, indicating that 
collinearity was likely present in the data set among one or more of the predictor 
variables. Therefore, a new MDA analysis was run, in which the X3 variable was 
eliminated. This equation had nearly identical classification accuracy and scoring as the 
four variable model, without any multicollinearity issues; thus, it was deemed to be
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superior to the four variable model. New variable coefficients and a new cutoff were 
then established, compared to the Z” model, which created a new discriminant function 
equation. Using this equation, overall prediction accuracy o f the new three variable 
model (the Kroeze model) was found to be 45/62, or 72.6 percent, which represents a 
dramatic improvement in prediction accuracy (Table 8).
Table 8
Kroeze Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix
Classified
Actual Bankrupt Non-bankrunt Total
Bankrupt 18 5 23
(783%0 (21.7%)
Non-bankrupt 12 27 39
(30.8%) (69.2%)
Total 30 32 62
( 100%) ( 100%)
Adapted from Altman, 1993
As shown above, 78.3 percent of bankrupt airline firms were correctly classified as 
bankrupt using the Kroeze model. Further, 69.2 percent o f non-bankrupt firms were 
correctly classified as non-bankrupt. This result represented a considerable improvement 
over the Z” model. The Z” model uses a grey area, where firms with Z” scores between 
1.1 and 2.6 are not classified. The Kroeze model is simpler. It does not use a grey area;
65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
instead, it classifies firms as either bankrupt, or non-bankrupt. Firms with a positive 
score are classified as non-bankrupt. Firms with a negative score are classified as 
bankrupt.
Finally, a second MDA was performed, this time using a fifth predictor variable (X5). 
X5 represented cash flow, which is net cash flow from operations divided by total 
liabilities. X5 was added to the Z” model, and to the Kroeze model. Although the MDA 
results were statistically significant, the addition of a new variable did not improve the 
classification accuracy of the models. In fact, the cash flow ratio reduced the models’ 
accuracy. Therefore, consistent with the objective of parsimony in academic research 
(Hair et al., 1998), fewer is better. The Kroeze model is preferable to the four and five 
variable models. Therefore, the models that included the cash flow variable were 
discarded for the remainder of this study.
When one compares the Z” model and the Kroeze model year by year, it is apparent 
that the Kroeze model outperformed the Z” model. First, the initial sample of sixteen 
airline firms, six bankrupt and ten non-bankrupt firms, was examined using data one 
financial statement prior to bankruptcy. The two models’ prediction accuracy matrices, 
one year prior to bankruptcy, are displayed below (Table 9). The Z” model predicted 
only half of the airline firms’ status correctly one year before a bankruptcy filing. The 
model classified only 50 percent of the sample correctly; that is, eight out of sixteen 
firms. The Kroeze model correctly classified thirteen out of sixteen airline firms for 
81.25 percent accuracy. This result represented a considerable improvement over the Z” 
model’s predictive accuracy. Therefore, the Kroeze model was more accurate than the 
Z” model one financial statement prior to bankruptcy.
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Table 9
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, One Year Prior to Bankruptcy
Z” Model. Classified Kroeze Model, Classified
Actual
Non- Grey 
Bankrupt Bankrupt Area
Non- 
Bankrupt Bankrupt Total
Bankrupt 6 0 0 5 1 6
Non-
Bankrupt
7 2 1 3 7 10
Adapted from Altman, 1993
A second test was made to observe the discriminating ability of the models, using 
data from financial statements produced two years prior to bankruptcy. This test showed 
that the Z” model had a 43.75 percent correct assignment rate; that is, seven out of 
sixteen firms were correctly classified. A test was also performed to observe the 
discriminating ability of the new model using data from two years prior to bankruptcy. 
The results are shown in Table 10. The reduction in the accuracy o f group classification 
is understandable as bankruptcy was more remote. Nonetheless, 68.75 percent correct 
assignment (that is, 11/16) is evidence that airline bankruptcy can be predicted two years 
prior to its actual occurrence by the Kroeze model.
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Table 10
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, Two Years Prior to Bankruptcy
Z” M odel Classified Kroeze Model. Classified
Actual Bankrupt
Non- Grey 
Bankrupt Area
Non- 
Bankrupt Bankrupt Total
Bankrupt 6 0 0 5 1 6
Non-
Bankrupt
7 1 2 4 6 10
Adapted from Altman, 1993
A third test was made to observe the discriminating ability of the model, using data 
from financial statements released three years prior to bankruptcy (Table 11). The Z” 
model classified firms correctly for 50 percent o f the sample; that is, for eight out of 
sixteen firms. Although this rate is slightly higher than the accuracy rate for a later 
period, one should not conclude that the Z” model improved with increased time. A third 
test was also made to assess the accuracy the Kroeze model in predicting bankruptcy 
three years prior to the event. Again, the new model produced 68.75 percent 
classification accuracy (11/16). This is evidence that airline bankruptcy can be predicted 
three years prior to the event using the Kroeze model.
68
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 11
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, Three Years Prior to Bankruptcy
Z” Model. Classified Kroeze Model. Classified
Actual Bankrupt
Non- Grey 
Bankrupt Area
Non- 
Bankrupt Bankrupt Total
Bankrupt 6 0 0 4 2 6
Non-
Bankrupt
7 2 1 3 7 10
Adapted from Altman, 1993
Finally, a fourth test was made, using financial statements produced four years prior 
to bankruptcy (Table 12). The Z” model correctly assigned seven out of fourteen firms, 
for 50 percent accuracy. The classification accuracy for the Kroeze model was 71.4 
percent; that is, ten out o f fourteen airline firms were correctly classified. This matrix 
excluded two firms that would have required the use of 1997 financial statements, which 
is beyond the time range used in this study. However, it is apparent that the Kroeze 
model can be used to predict airline bankruptcy up to four years prior to the actual event.
69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 12
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, Four Years Prior to Bankruptcy
Z” Model, Classified Kroeze Model, Classified
Actual Bankrupt
Non- Grey 
Bankrupt Area
Non- 
Bankrupt Bankrupt Total
Bankrupt 5 0 0 3 2 5
Non-
Bankrupt
5 2 2 2 7 9
Adapted from Altman, 1993
In summary, the results of comparing the models showed that for each of the four 
years before a bankruptcy filing, the Kroeze model consistently outperformed the Z” 
model in terms of prediction accuracy. Second, the Kroeze model used fewer variables in 
striving for parsimony. Third, the single cut-off o f zero made classification very simple. 
Therefore, the Kroeze model is preferable to the Z” model in predicting airline firm 
bankruptcy up to four years before the event. Next, the two models were tested for 
statistical significance.
Chi Square Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
To test hypotheses about data that use counts, one computes a chi-square statistic and 
compares its value to the chi-square distribution to see how unlikely the observed value is 
if  the null hypothesis is true (Norusis, 2001). The assumptions needed to use the chi- 
square test are: 1) the categories o f a variable don’t overlap, 2 ) most of the expected
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
counts must be greater than five; and, 3) none of the expected counts can be less than 
one. These assumptions have been met.
A total o f 62 cases were classified above. The same 62 cases will be used to test the 
hypotheses.
The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are as follows;
H Iq: There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
HI a: There is a relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the 
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2o: A revised bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”- 
score model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2a: a  revised bankruptcy prediction model is better than the Altman Z”-score 
model in predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
First, the Z” model was tested to determine if it classified better than a naïve 
prediction. Hypothesis Hl o  states that there is no relationship between the Altman Z”- 
Score model and the likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm. As shown in Table 13, 
the critical chi-square value of 7.87944 (p=.005, d f 1) was not met. The Z” model failed, 
and hypothesis Hl o  is not rejected. There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-Score 
and the likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm. Hypothesis HI a is rejected.
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Table 13
Chi-Square Analysis, Z ” Model
Correct Not Correct Total 
Count 30 32 62
Expected Count 23 39 62
(30-23)^/23 + (32-39)^/39 -  3.86
Next, the Kroeze model was tested. The second hypothesis states that a revised 
bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”-Seore model in predicting 
the likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm. Therefore, the Kroeze model was 
compared to the Z” model. As shown in Table 14, the critical value of 7.87944 was 
reached (p=.005, d f 1). Therefore, Hypothesis H2q is rejected, and Hypothesis H2a is
accepted. The Kroeze model is better than the Altman Z”-Score model in predicting the
likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
Table 14
Chi-Square Analysis, Kroeze Model versus Z ” Model
______ Correct Not Correct Total
Count 45 17 62
Z” Count 30 32 62
(45-30)^/30 + (17-32)^/32 = 14.53
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The Kroeze model is also better than a naïve prediction model in predicting airline 
firm bankruptcy. See Table 15. The critical value of 7.87944 was reached (p=.005, df 1).
Table 15
Chi-Square Analysis, Kroeze Model versus Naïve Prediction
Correct Not Correct Total
Count 45 17 62
Expected Count 23 39 62
(45-23)^/23 + (17-39)^/39 = 33.45
The Kroeze model is shown in Table 16. The cutoff for this model is 0.0. Therefore, 
a firm with a negative K score is classified as bankrupt. A firm with a positive K score is 
classified as non-bankrupt.
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Table 16 
Kroeze Model
K -  .268Xi + .838X2 +. 111X3 + é
Where:
X] = working capital/total assets;
X2 = retained earnings/total assets;
X3 = book value of equity/total liabilities; 
s = error term; and,
K = overall index.
Findings
The Kroeze model calculates a score which, if  negative, indicates a classification of 
bankruptcy. If  the score is positive, a classification o f non-bankruptcy is indicated.
In the Kroeze model, the most important predictor o f bankruptcy is the variable that 
represents retained earnings divided by total assets. It makes intuitive sense that negative 
retained earnings would spell financial distress for an airline. A firm can not sustain net 
losses for an extended amount o f time without failing.
The Kroeze model predicted that Air Canada, Hawaiian, and US Airways would go 
bankrupt four years before the actual occurrence of their bankruptcies. The Kroeze 
model predicted that TWA would go bankrupt three years before it did. It also predicted 
that AT A would go bankrupt two years prior to the actual event, and that United would
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go bankrupt one year prior to its actual bankruptcy filing. This situation constitutes good 
prediction accuracy up to four years before tbe actual event occurs.
See Figures 1 through 16 below for each airline’s K-score graph. Graphs of the six 
major or national airlines that filed for bankruptcy between 1998 and 2004 are shown 
first, followed by graphs of the ten major or national airlines that did not file for 
bankruptcy during the same period. A score that falls below zero indicates a prediction of 
bankruptcy.
The Kroeze model made bankruptcy predictions for Air Canada using 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002 and 2003 financial statements. Air Canada did file for bankruptcy in 2003. 
Therefore, the model was accurate four years before the event, and consistently made 
accurate bankruptcy predictions. See Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. Air Canada’s K-scores, 1999-2003.
The Kroeze model also produced AT A negative K-scores, indicating a bankruptcy 
prediction, using financial statement data from 2002 and 2003. AT A filed for bankruptcy 
in 2004. Therefore, the model gave an accurate prediction two years before the actual 
bankruptcy filing. The model gave bankruptcy predictions in botb 2002 and 2003. See 
figure 2 below.
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Figure 2. ATA’s K-scores, 1998-2003
The Kroeze model predicted Hawaiian’s 2003 bankruptcy in 1999. The model was 
correct four years prior to the event. Additionally, the model accurately predicted 
Hawaiian’s bankruptcy, five years in a row. See figure 3 below.
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Figures. Hawaiian’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
According to the model, TWA’s scores indicated bankruptcy four years before tbe 
actual event in 2001. TWA flew tbeir last official flight in December of 2001 and were 
subsequently liquidated under Chapter 7 o f tbe bankruptcy code. See Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4. TWA’s K-scores, 1998-2001.
United Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 2003. Its K-scores indicated bankruptcy in 
2001. Their K scores were consistently negative for three years. As o f the time of this 
writing, United is still operating under bankruptcy protection, and is still in financial 
distress. As discussed earlier. United applied for federal loan guarantees three times. 
They have been turned down all three times. See figure 5 below.
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Figure 5. United’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
US Airways filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2002. They then applied for, and 
received, a $900 million federal loan guarantee (Maynard, 2004). However, they again 
declared bankruptcy in 2004. At the time of this writing, they are still reorganizing and 
operating under bankruptcy protection. Observe that their K-scores are negative for each 
year o f this study. See Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6 . US Airway’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
Valu Jet, now called AirTran, filed for bankruptcy following a devastating 1996 plane 
crash in the Florida Everglades. It is no surprise, therefore, that their K-scores were 
negative for several years after their bankruptcy. In 2003, they earned a positive K-score. 
AirTran did not declare bankruptcy during the period of this study. See Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7. AirTran's K-scores, 1998-2003.
Alaska did not file for bankruptcy, nor did they apply for a federal loan guarantee. 
Alaska consistently earned positive K-scores during the period of this study. See Figure 
8 .
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Alaska
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.05
0.00
2002 20031998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Figure 8 . Alaska’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
Note that America West received positive K-scores for 1998 through 2001, but then 
received negative K-scores in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, according to the model, 
America will file for bankruptcy protection in the near future, as shown in Figure 9. 
Also, they did not cam a profit in 2004. America West managers, employees, and 
investors should be aware that America West is in financial distress.
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Figure 9. America West’s K-Scores, 1998-2003.
As discussed earlier, American was very close to filing for bankruptcy recently. As 
shown in Figure 10, the K-score model predicts that American will declare bankruptcy in 
the near future. Their K-scores were positive until 2002, when the scores fell below zero. 
Additionally, American sustained negative earnings in 2004.
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Figure 10. American’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
Continental has earned positive K-scores over the period of this study, as shown in 
Figure 11. However, they sustained negative earnings in 2004. Investors would be well 
advised to monitor Continental’s financial performance.
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Figure 11. Continental’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
Interestingly, much has been written recently about Delta’s financial problems. Some 
analysts stated that it was only hours away from a bankruptcy filing in 2004 (Maynard). 
However, its retained earnings were still positive at the end o f 2003, and the new model 
does yet predict its bankruptcy. However, inspection o f the graph of its K-scores in 
Figure 12 indicates that firm’s financial performance should be closely watched, since its 
K-score is very low. Furthermore, Delta suffered the worst losses in the history of the 
airline industry in 2004. An update that includes these 2004 results gives a prediction of 
bankruptcy. This study, however, was restricted to using 1998 to 2003 financial 
statements.
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Figure 12. Delta’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
Frontier’s scores have been positive since 1999. Their K-seores dropped after the 
year 2001, as shown in Figure 13. Frontier applied, and received, federal loan 
guarantees, as discussed earlier. They did not earn a bankruptcy prediction.
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Frontier
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Figure 13. Frontier’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
JetBlue, a low-eost carrier, has been a publicly owned entity only since 2001. Their 
score, in 2001, was negative, which is expected for a new firm, as shown in Figure 14. 
They, and Southwest, have been the only airlines to earn profits in recent years.
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Figure 14. JetBlue’s K-scores, 2001-2003.
Northwest has not earned a profit in years, and as such, is predicted to file for 
bankruptcy in the near future. As shown in Figure 15, their K-seores are negative over 
the entire length of this study. Poor financial performance like this cannot be sustained 
indefinitely.
89
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Northwest
0.00
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
- 0.02
-0.04
2
8-0.06
CO
-̂o.oa
- 0.10
- 0.12
Year
Figure 15. Northwest’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
Southwest has been the airline industry’s star performer. As shown below in Figure 
16, their K-scores have been positive over the length of this study. It is interesting to 
note that their score dips a little in the year 2001 , the year o f the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
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Figure 16. Southwest’s K-scores, 1998-2003.
General Implications
The Kroeze model predicted that America West will file for bankruptcy, as well as 
American and Northwest. As of the date of this writing, these airlines have not filed for 
bankruptcy. However, none of these airlines produced a profit in 2004. Further, America 
West had negative retained earnings in 2002 and 2003. Also, American had negative 
retained earnings in 2002 and 2003. Finally, Northwest has had negative retained 
earnings for the entire period o f the study, 1998-2003. These facts suggest that America 
West, American, and Northwest are in financial distress and, according to the Kroeze 
model, will file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the near future. Inspection of the
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graphs indicate that Delta, Northwest, America West, and American all appear to be in 
financial distress. Their K-scores are below, or very close to, zero. One would ideally 
want to use the 2004 financial report for up-to-date predictions.
The issue arises that the Kroeze model may only work for the time since the events of 
September 11, 2001. With this is mind, it is known that TWA filed for bankruptcy in 
1995, which is, of course, a time well before 2001. TWA’s K-score for the year 1994 
was calculated as -.33. This K-score is well below zero, and would have generated a 
bankruptcy prediction for TWA. Thus, the model’s strength is supported by this analysis.
Financial ratios appear to work well to help predict bankruptcy up to four years ahead 
of the event. Further studies, however, should be undertaken on other industries over a 
recent period.
The statistical significance of each predictor variable is shown below in Figures 17 
and 18. All four variables had F values that were statistically significant (p<.005, df 88). 
Additionally, the tolerance levels were all over 0.1, which indicates that multicollinearity 
is not a problem.
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Figure 17. Predictor variables and significance.
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Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
X1 Between
Groups .095 1 .095 7.256 .008
Within
Groups 1.154 88 .013
Total 1.249 89
X2 Between
Groups 1.605 1 1.605 38.189 .000
Within
Groups 3.697 88 .042
Total 5.302 89
X3 Between
Groups 2.764 1 2.764 26.923 .000
Within
Groups 9.034 88 .103
Total 11.798 89
Figure 18. Analysis of variance.
Jackknifed (leave-one-out) Classification 
SPSS provides a jackknifed or leave-one-out classification. In this classification, the 
data from the firm are left out when the coefficients used to assign it to a group are 
computed. This is a method of cross-validation to ensure validity and generalizability of 
the results. When the original and cross-validated proportions are the same or similar, the 
results are consistent and classification is valid (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). As seen in 
Figure 19, the results are 75.6 percent of original groups correctly classified and 74.4 
percent of cross-validated groups correctly classified. These proportions are similar. 
Therefore, the results are consistent and the elassification is valid.
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Predicted Group 
Membership
B1N2 1.00 2.00 Total
Original Count 1.00 16 17 33
2.00 5 52 57
Percent 1.00 48.5 51.5 100.0
2.00 8.8 91.2 100.0
Cross­
validated
(a)
Count 1.00
2.00
15
5
18
52
33
57
Percent 1.00 45.5 54.5 100.0
2.00 8.8 91.2 100.0
a Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by 
the functions derived from all cases other than that case, 
b 75.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified, 
c 74.4% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.
Figure 19. Classification table.
Unequal Sample Size and Missing Data 
There were 90 cases. The 90 cases, obtained from 1998 through 2003 financial 
reports, included five Air Canada cases, six Hawaiian Air cases, four TWA cases, six US 
Airways cases, six United cases, six America West cases, six Frontier cases, six Alaska 
cases, six American cases, six Continental cases, six Northwest cases, six Southwest 
cases, three JetBlue cases, six Delta cases, six AT A cases, and six Air Tran cases.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) state that there are no special problems posed by 
unequal sample sizes using MDA. There were 33 cases in the bankrupt group and 57 
cases in the non-bankrupt group that were used to create the discriminant function. The 
sample size of the smallest group, 33, exceeded the number of predictor variables, five. 
During classification, unequal sample sizes of the two groups, bankrupt and non­
bankrupt, were used to modify the probabilities with which cases are classified into
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groups. Had this not been done, the MDA program would have used a default probability 
of 50 percent chance of bankruptcy and 50 percent chance of non-bankruptcy.
Linearity
The independent variables were linearly related to the dependent variable in the new 
model, as shown below in the scatterplots in Figure 20. By inspection, it appears that the 
independent variables have a roughly linear relationship to the dependent variable. 
Therefore, the assumption of linearity was met and data transformation was not 
necessary.
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Figure 20. Linearity.
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Equality of Variances 
A Levene test for equality of variances was performed on the two groups, bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt (Figure 21). The statistical significance was such that one can accept 
the hypothesis that the two population variances are equal (Norusis, 2001). Therefore, 
the assumption of equal variances was met.
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sip. t df
Sig.
(2-
talled)
Mean
DIffere
nee
Std.
Error
DIfferen
ce
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
New3 Equal 
var variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not
assumed
2.80
4 .098 6.434
6.095
88
56.645
.000
.000
-.29064
-.29064
.04517
.04768
.38041
.38614
.2008
6
.1951
4
Figure 21. Levene’s test for equality of variances.
Multicollinearity and Singularity 
SPSS 12 was used for the major analysis, which protects against multicollinearity 
through checks of tolerance. The tolerances were all higher than 0.1. Therefore, 
multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem (Figure 22).
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Figure 22. Collinearity tolerance.
Outliers
Discriminant analysis is sensitive to the inclusion o f outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001). Therefore, a test was run for univariate and multivariate outliers for each group 
separately, both bankrupt and non-bankrupt. A very conservative criterion for 
multivariate outliers is Mahalanobis distance at a significance level /?<.001. There were 
four variables in the Z” model; therefore, the critical value of A^(4)=l8.467. Thus, any 
case with a Mahalanobis distance greater than 18.467 was treated as a multivariate 
outlier. Using SPSS 12.0, the Mahalanobis distance was obtained by running a dummy 
regression and saving it as a new variable in the data set. See Appendix, Figures 23 and 
24.
A dummy regression was run using the three variables Xi, X2, and X4 as independent 
variables and the K scores as the dependent variable in order to obtain Mahalanobis 
distances. There were no outliers among the K scores. However, there were a few 
extreme variable values found among the independent variables. All o f the values were 
verified and were found to be correct.
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Box plots of the predictor variables and independent variable were run (Appendix, 
Figures 25, 26, 27, and 28). Three cases had unusual values for Xi, the working capital 
to total asset ratio. One case corresponded to Hawaiian Air, which in 2002, had large, 
negative working capital. Another case represented Frontier, which also had large, 
negative working capital. The last case corresponded to Air Tran, which had large, 
positive working capital. The cases were verified, found to be correct, and were kept in 
the analysis. Incidentally, it is not unusual for airlines to show a negative working capital 
amount, as passengers pay for seats on flights before the flights are actually taken. 
Among the X2 variable values, one case had an unusual value; Air Tran’s 1999 retained 
earnings to total assets ratio was very low. The data was verified and found to be correct. 
Among the X4 variable values, was one extreme value found: Hawaiian Air, 1998. The 
value was checked and verified. Hawaiian, classified as bankrupt, had had a relatively 
healthy owners’ equity to total liabilities ratio in 1998. All o f these extreme values were 
found to be correct, and they were also retained in the analysis.
Normality
The sample sizes used in this study were large enough (i.e., more than 20) to suggest 
normality of the sampling distributions o f means. No tests are currently feasible for 
testing the normality of all linear combinations of the sampling distributions o f means of 
predictors. However, Q-Q plots (Appendix, Figures 29 30, 31, 32) o f the three predictor 
variables and the dependent variable seores suggest univariate normality. The points 
cluster around a straight line which suggests that the data were from a normal distribution 
(Norusis, 2001).
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Summary
This chapter showed that the Kroeze model for predieting airline firm bankruptcy was 
far superior to the Z” model. The Kroeze model used only three variables, predicted 
membership to only one of two groups, and used a simple zero as a cut-off to distinguish 
whether a firm belonged to the bankrupt group or the non-bankrupt group. Furthermore, 
the Kroeze model’s predictions were accurate up to four years in advance o f a bankruptcy 
filing. Additionally, its results were statistically significant. All o f the assumptions of 
MDA were tested and met. The Z” model, on the other hand, used four variables, did not 
always give a classification to one o f two groups, and used two eut-offs. Furthermore, it 
performed no better than a naïve prediction in determining whether an airline firm should 
have been classified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt.
The final chapter of this work summarizes the study and discusses the status of 
each airline firm. The implications o f the test of the hypotheses are discussed, as well as 
possibilities for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction
This chapter summarizes and discusses the findings o f this dissertation, and reviews 
the implications that stem from those findings. In the first section of the chapter, a 
summary of the study and a discussion of the findings are presented. Then, some general 
implications arising from the study are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the 
study’s limitations. The chapter coneludes with suggestions for future research.
Summary of the Study 
This dissertation discussed the state of the airline industry and corporate bankruptcy 
prediction models. The Altman Z”-Score model (Z” model) was tested for its capacity to 
predict airline firm bankruptcy, using financial statements from the period 1998-2003. A 
new model was created, using MDA and three of the four Z” model’s predictor variables. 
Both of these models were compared against the results o f a naïve prediction. The Z” 
model performed no better than a naïve prediction in predicting airline firm bankruptcy. 
The new three variable model, however, was able to predict airline firm bankruptcy quite 
accurately up to four years before the actual event.
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Findings
The Kroeze model calculates a score which, if  negative, indicates a classification of 
bankruptcy. If the score is positive, a classification of non-bankruptcy is indicated.
In the Kroeze model, the most important predictor of bankruptcy is the variable that 
represents retained earnings divided by total assets. It makes intuitive sense that negative 
retained earnings would spell financial distress for an airline. A firm can not sustain net 
losses for an extended amount of time without failing.
The Kroeze model predicted that Air Canada, Hawaiian, and US Airways would go 
bankrupt four years before the actual occurrence of their bankrupteies. The Kroeze 
model predicted that TWA would go bankrupt three years before it did. It also predicted 
that AT A would go bankrupt two years prior to the actual event, and that United would 
go bankrupt one year prior to its actual bankruptcy filing. This situation constitutes good 
prediction accuracy up to four years before the actual event occurs.
The Kroeze model predicted that Ameriea West will file bankruptcy, as well as 
American and Northwest. As of the date of this writing, these airlines have not filed for 
bankruptcy. However, none of these airlines produced a profit in 2004. Further, America 
West had negative retained earnings in 2002 and 2003. Also, American had negative 
retained earnings in 2002 and 2003. Finally, Northwest has had negative retained 
earnings for the entire period of the study, 1998-2003. These facts suggest that America 
West, American, and Northwest are in financial distress and could file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in the near future. See Figures 6 through 21 below for each 
airline’s K-score graph. Graphs of the six major or national airlines that filed for 
bankruptcy between 1998 and 2004 are shown first, followed by graphs of the ten major
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or national airlines that did not file for bankruptcy during the same period. Scores below 
zero indicate a prediction of bankruptcy.
Interestingly, much has been written recently about Delta’s financial problems. Some 
analysts stated that it was only hours away from a bankruptcy filing in 2004 (Maynard, 
2004). However, its retained earnings were still positive at the end o f 2003, and the new 
model does not yet predict its bankruptcy. However, inspection of the graph of its K- 
scores in Figure 17 indicates that firm’s financial performance should be closely watched, 
since its K-score is very low.
General Implications
Inspection o f the graphs indicate that Delta, Northwest, Ameriea West, and American 
all appear to be in financial distress. Their K-scores are below, or very close to, zero. 
One would ideally want the 2004 financial report for an up-to-date prediction.
Financial ratios appear to work well to help predict bankruptcy up to four years ahead 
o f the event. Further studies, however, should be undertaken on other industries over a 
recent period.
The transportation industry is critical to the economy to the United States. 
Hospitality and tourism, for example, rely on the movement of consumers as a crucial 
part of their business. Reliable, affordable air transport allows people to conduct 
business effeetively and enjoy leisure activities away from home. The airline industry 
employs millions of people, directly and indirectly. There are many stakeholders in the 
future of the airline industry including travelers, employees, and investors.
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Key Limitations
This study did not include financial ratios from 2004 annual reports. The 2004 
financial statements were not yet available at the time of this writing. This study cannot 
be generalized to all airlines. Only publicly owned airlines were analyzed in this study. 
This study cannot be generalized to other service industry firms. Further studies should 
be done to test the new model on relatively homogenous industries, using recent data, 
especially restaurants.
Financial statement data is based on historical costs and accrual accounting. As such, 
assets are not shown at current value or replacement value. Net income is not the same as 
cash flow. Depreciafion uses estimates of the expected life of a long-ferm asset. 
Airlines, for example, use the historical costs o f their purchased jets, rather than current 
value or replacement value. Therefore, accounting data must be used with these 
weaknesses in mind.
Some firms have conducted off-balance sheet transactions. Although US Airways, 
for example, stated in its financial statements that there were no off-balance sheet 
transactions, there is the possibility that firms can effectively hide debt. This study did 
not seek to discover hidden debt.
There are weaknesses associated with the use o f MDA to predict corporate 
bankruptcy. The variances of the two groups, bankrupt and non-bankrupt, must be the 
same. This condition was met in this study; however, this may not always be the case. 
Additionally, the predictor ratios must be normally distributed. Again, this may not 
always be true, as it was in this study. Different researchers have used between one and 
seven ratios in their discriminant functions: Deakin (1972); Edmister (1972); and Beaver
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(1967). Some researchers developed bankruptcy prediction models using the logit 
technique (Ohlson, 1980) because they felt that violating MDA’s assumptions was 
unimportant.
Suggestions for Future Research
The results of this study should be studied to determine if the K-score is a measure of 
the overall financial health of the airline. It may be possible that the K-score’s magnitude 
is meaningful.
Additional data needs to be analyzed. When 2004 financial reports for the same 
sixteen airlines become available, the airlines’ new scores should be calculated and 
revised predictions should be made.
Other statistical techniques might be tested. As mentioned above, in cases where 
some o f the assumptions of MDA may not be met, it may be useful to employ logit 
analysis.
The Kroeze model should be tested on the restaurant business, using recent financial 
data. Whether or not this bankruptcy prediction model is suitable for other service 
businesses is unknown. Altman states that a bankruptcy prediction model that utilizes a 
homogeneous group of bankrupt companies and data as near to the present as possible is 
ideal.
The practical and theoretical applications of bankruptcy prediction models are many 
and varied. These include banking and credit analysis, and the assessment of an 
individual firm’s financial condition. Other suggestions for future research include: 1) 
perform a study of airline financial performance for the years before September 11, 2001,
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and after September 11, 2001 to see if results are the same. This will help offset the 
notion that this study was flawed by the impact of the events of September 11, 2001. Not 
every airline filed for bankruptcy after that time. 2) Look at airline stock prices and 
compare to the Kroeze model’s predictions to determine how well the market predicted 
bankruptcy; and, 3) develop a probit model that creates a dependent variable to be 
defined as the probability o f bankruptcy.
Summary
This study has shown that financial ratios can be used to predict airline firm 
bankruptcy. The accuracy of a traditional model was tested. The traditional model did 
not predict airline firm bankruptcy accurately. A new, simpler model was developed, the 
Kroeze model. This new model was quite accurate in predicting airline firm bankruptcy 
up to four years ahead of the actual event.
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APPENDIX 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value -.6927 .1186 -.1871 .23267 33
Std. Predicted Value -2.173 1.314 .000 1.000 33
Standard Error of 
Predicted Value .000 .000 .000 .000 33
Adjusted Predicted Value -.6927 .1186 -.1871 .23267 33
Residual .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 33
Std. Residual -1.576 1.612 .000 .952 33
Stud. Residual -1.690 1.693 .012 1.026 33
Deleted Residual .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 33
Stud. Deleted Residual -1.749 1.752 .011 1.042 33
Mahal. Distance .294 15.398 2.909 3.110 33
Cook's Distance .000 .396 .048 .076 33
Centered Leverage Value .009 .481 .091 .097 33
a Dependent Variable: K-Score
Figure 23. Mahalanobis Distance, Kroeze Model.
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value -.3556 .4636 .1039 .19028 57
Std. Predicted Value -2.415 1.890 .000 1.000 57
Standard Error of 
Predicted Value .000 .000 .000 .000 57
Adjusted Predicted Value -.3556 .4636 .1066 .19094 56
Residual .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 57
Std. Residual -1.905 2.112 .000 .973 57
Stud. Residual -1.964 2.170 .003 1.018 56
Deleted Residual .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 56
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.020 2.252 .003 1.029 56
Mahal. Distance .392 10.858 2.947 2.377 57
Cook's Distance .000 .113 .020 .024 56
Centered Leverage Value .007 .194 .053 .042 57
a Dependent Variable: K-Score
Figure 24. Mahalanobis Distance, Kroeze Model, Non-Bankrupt Group.
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Figure 25. Predictor Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 26. Predictor Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 27. Predictor Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 28. Dependent Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Normal Q-Q Plot of X1
0.3
0 . 2 -
0 . 1 -
0 .0 -
" S  -0.1 -
UJ -0 .2 -
-0 .3 -
-0.4
-0.4 - 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Observed Value
Figure 29. Test for Normality of Predictor Xi.
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Figure 30. Test for Normality of Predictor X2.
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Figure 31. Test for Normality of Predictor X3.
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Figure 32. Test for Normality for K-Scores.
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Analysis Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Cases N Percent
Valid 90 100.0
Excluded Missing or out-of­
.0range group codes 0
At least one
missing 0 .0discriminating
variable
Both missing or
out-of-range group
codes and at least 0 .0one missing
discriminating
variable
Total 0 .0
Total 90 100.0
Group Statistics
B1N2 Mean Std. Deviation
Valid N (listwise)
Unweighted Weighted
1.00 XI -.0888 .11972 33 33.000
X2 -.1941 .23495 33 33.000
X4 -.0056 .24110 33 33.000
2.00 XI -.0214 .11142 57 57.000
X2 .0830 .18569 57 57.000
X4 .3580 .35791 57 57.000
Total XI -.0461 .11847 90 90.000
X2 -.0186 .24407 90 90.000
X4 .2247 .36409 90 90.000
Tests of Equaiity of Group Means
Wilks'
Lambda F dfl df2 Sig.
XI .924 7.256 1 88 .008
X2 .697 38.189 1 88 .000
X4 .766 26.923 1 88 .000
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Pooled Within-Groups Matrices(a)
XI X2 X4
Covariance X1 .013 .003 .012
X2 .003 .042 .047
X4 .012 .047 .103
Correlation X1 1.000 .135 .316
X2 .135 1.000 .723
X4 .316 .723 1.000
a The covariance matrix has 88 degrees of freedom.
Covariance Matrices(a)
B1N2 XI X2 X4
1.00 XI .014 .011 .008
X2 .011 .055 .044
X4 .008 .044 .058
2.00 XI .012 -.001 .013
X2 -.001 .034 .049
X4 .013 .049 .128
Total XI .014 .008 .017
X2 .008 .060 .071
X4 .017 .071 .133
a The total covariance matrix has 89 degrees of freedom.
Log Determinants
B1N2 Rank
Log
Determinant
1.00 3 -11.098
2.00 3 -11.000
Pooled within-groups 3 -10.645
The ranks and natural logarithms of determinants printed are those of the group covariance matrices.
Test Results
Box's M 34.361
F Approx. 5.492
dfl 6
df2 29416.901
Sig. .000
Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices.
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Eigenvalues
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation
1 .477(a) 100.0 100.0 .568
a First 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis.
Wilks' Lambda
Test of Function(s)
Wilks'
Lambda Chi-square df Sig.
1 .677 33.712 3 .000
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
Function
1
XI .268
X2 .838
X4 .111
Structure Matrix
Function
1
X2 .954
X4 .801
XI .416
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant 
functions Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.
Functions at Group Centroids
B1N2
Function
1
1.00
2.00
-.897
.519
Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means
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Classification Processing Summary
Processed 90
Excluded Missing or out-of­
0range group codes 
At least one missing
discriminating
variable
0
Used in Output 90
Prior Probabilities for Groups
B1N2 Prior
Cases Used in 
Analysis
Unweighted Weighted
1.00 .367 33 33.000
2.00 .633 57 57.000
Total 1.000 90 90.000
Classification Results (b,c)
B1N2
Predicted Group 
Membership
Total1.00 2.00
Original Count 1.00 16 17 33
2.00 5 52 57
% 1.00 48.5 51.5 100.0
2.00 8.8 91.2 100.0
Gross- Count 1.00 15 18 33
validated( 2.00 5 52 57
° ) % 1.00 45.5 54.5 100.0
2.00 8.8 91.2 100.0
a Gross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by 
the functions derived from all cases other than that case, 
b 75.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified, 
c 74.4% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.
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